[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.11] x86/msr: fix handling of MSR_IA32_PERF_{STATUS/CTL}
commit 3b5de119f0399cbe745502cb6ebd5e6633cc139c Author: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Oct 6 18:23:27 2020 +0200 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Nov 10 17:50:37 2020 +0000 x86/msr: fix handling of MSR_IA32_PERF_{STATUS/CTL} Currently a PV hardware domain can also be given control over the CPU frequency, and such guest is allowed to write to MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL. However since commit 322ec7c89f6 the default behavior has been changed to reject accesses to not explicitly handled MSRs, preventing PV guests that manage CPU frequency from reading MSR_IA32_PERF_{STATUS/CTL}. Additionally some HVM guests (Windows at least) will attempt to read MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL and will panic if given back a #GP fault: vmx.c:3035:d8v0 RDMSR 0x00000199 unimplemented d8v0 VIRIDIAN CRASH: 3b c0000096 fffff806871c1651 ffffda0253683720 0 Move the handling of MSR_IA32_PERF_{STATUS/CTL} to the common MSR handling shared between HVM and PV guests, and add an explicit case for reads to MSR_IA32_PERF_{STATUS/CTL}. Restore previous behavior and allow PV guests with the required permissions to read the contents of the mentioned MSRs. Non privileged guests will get 0 when trying to read those registers, as writes to MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL by such guest will already be silently dropped. Fixes: 322ec7c89f6 ('x86/pv: disallow access to unknown MSRs') Fixes: 84e848fd7a1 ('x86/hvm: disallow access to unknown MSRs') Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 3059178798a23ba870ff86ff54d442a07e6651fc) --- xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c | 14 -------------- xen/include/xen/sched.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 256e58d82b..3495ac9f4a 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v) int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) { + const struct domain *d = v->domain; const struct cpuid_policy *cp = v->domain->arch.cpuid; const struct msr_domain_policy *dp = v->domain->arch.msr; const struct msr_vcpu_policy *vp = v->arch.msr; @@ -211,6 +212,25 @@ int guest_rdmsr(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) _MSR_MISC_FEATURES_CPUID_FAULTING; break; + /* + * These MSRs are not enumerated in CPUID. They have been around + * since the Pentium 4, and implemented by other vendors. + * + * Some versions of Windows try reading these before setting up a #GP + * handler, and Linux has several unguarded reads as well. Provide + * RAZ semantics, in general, but permit a cpufreq controller dom0 to + * have full access. + */ + case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS: + case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL: + if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_INTEL | X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR)) ) + goto gp_fault; + + *val = 0; + if ( likely(!is_cpufreq_controller(d)) || rdmsr_safe(msr, *val) == 0 ) + break; + goto gp_fault; + /* * TODO: Implement when we have better topology representation. case MSR_INTEL_CORE_THREAD_COUNT: @@ -241,6 +261,7 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) case MSR_INTEL_CORE_THREAD_COUNT: case MSR_INTEL_PLATFORM_INFO: case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES: + case MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS: /* Read-only */ case MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT: case MSR_TSX_CTRL: @@ -345,6 +366,21 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) break; } + /* + * This MSR is not enumerated in CPUID. It has been around since the + * Pentium 4, and implemented by other vendors. + * + * To match the RAZ semantics, implement as write-discard, except for + * a cpufreq controller dom0 which has full access. + */ + case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL: + if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_INTEL | X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR)) ) + goto gp_fault; + + if ( likely(!is_cpufreq_controller(d)) || wrmsr_safe(msr, val) == 0 ) + break; + goto gp_fault; + default: return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c index 8120ded330..755f00db33 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c @@ -816,12 +816,6 @@ static inline uint64_t guest_misc_enable(uint64_t val) return val; } -static inline bool is_cpufreq_controller(const struct domain *d) -{ - return ((cpufreq_controller == FREQCTL_dom0_kernel) && - is_hardware_domain(d)); -} - static int read_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t *val, struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { @@ -1096,14 +1090,6 @@ static int write_msr(unsigned int reg, uint64_t val, return X86EMUL_OKAY; break; - case MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL: - if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ) - break; - if ( likely(!is_cpufreq_controller(currd)) || - wrmsr_safe(reg, val) == 0 ) - return X86EMUL_OKAY; - break; - case MSR_IA32_THERM_CONTROL: case MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ) diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h index c0cc5d9336..7e4ad5d51b 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -920,6 +920,22 @@ extern enum cpufreq_controller { FREQCTL_none, FREQCTL_dom0_kernel, FREQCTL_xen } cpufreq_controller; +static always_inline bool is_cpufreq_controller(const struct domain *d) +{ + /* + * A PV dom0 can be nominated as the cpufreq controller, instead of using + * Xen's cpufreq driver, at which point dom0 gets direct access to certain + * MSRs. + * + * This interface only works when dom0 is identity pinned and has the same + * number of vCPUs as pCPUs on the system. + * + * It would be far better to paravirtualise the interface. + */ + return (is_pv_domain(d) && is_hardware_domain(d) && + cpufreq_controller == FREQCTL_dom0_kernel); +} + #define CPUPOOLID_NONE -1 struct cpupool *cpupool_get_by_id(int poolid); -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.11
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