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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.14] tools/xenstore: allow special watches for privileged callers only
commit 5073c6b169dd12ec02afc145d4177f97831646e0
Author: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Jun 11 16:12:45 2020 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Dec 15 14:06:17 2020 +0100
tools/xenstore: allow special watches for privileged callers only
The special watches "@introduceDomain" and "@releaseDomain" should be
allowed for privileged callers only, as they allow to gain information
about presence of other guests on the host. So send watch events for
those watches via privileged connections only.
In order to allow for disaggregated setups where e.g. driver domains
need to make use of those special watches add support for calling
"set permissions" for those special nodes, too.
This is part of XSA-115.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>
---
docs/misc/xenstore.txt | 5 ++++
tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 27 +++++++++++-------
tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h | 2 ++
tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h | 5 ++++
tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c | 4 +++
6 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
index cb8009cb68..2081f20f55 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
+++ b/docs/misc/xenstore.txt
@@ -170,6 +170,9 @@ SET_PERMS <path>|<perm-as-string>|+?
n<domid> no access
See https://wiki.xen.org/wiki/XenBus section
`Permissions' for details of the permissions system.
+ It is possible to set permissions for the special watch paths
+ "@introduceDomain" and "@releaseDomain" to enable receiving those
+ watches in unprivileged domains.
---------- Watches ----------
@@ -194,6 +197,8 @@ WATCH <wpath>|<token>|?
@releaseDomain occurs on any domain crash or
shutdown, and also on RELEASE
and domain destruction
+ <wspecial> events are sent to privileged callers or explicitly
+ via SET_PERMS enabled domains only.
When a watch is first set up it is triggered once straight
away, with <path> equal to <wpath>. Watches may be triggered
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
index 79d305fbbe..15ffbeb30f 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
@@ -470,8 +470,8 @@ static int write_node(struct connection *conn, struct node
*node,
return write_node_raw(conn, &key, node, no_quota_check);
}
-static enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
- const struct node_perms *perms)
+enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
+ const struct node_perms *perms)
{
unsigned int i;
enum xs_perm_type mask = XS_PERM_READ|XS_PERM_WRITE|XS_PERM_OWNER;
@@ -1247,22 +1247,29 @@ static int do_set_perms(struct connection *conn, struct
buffered_data *in)
if (perms.num < 2)
return EINVAL;
- /* First arg is node name. */
- /* We must own node to do this (tools can do this too). */
- node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, in->buffer, &name,
- XS_PERM_WRITE | XS_PERM_OWNER);
- if (!node)
- return errno;
-
permstr = in->buffer + strlen(in->buffer) + 1;
perms.num--;
- perms.p = talloc_array(node, struct xs_permissions, perms.num);
+ perms.p = talloc_array(in, struct xs_permissions, perms.num);
if (!perms.p)
return ENOMEM;
if (!xs_strings_to_perms(perms.p, perms.num, permstr))
return errno;
+ /* First arg is node name. */
+ if (strstarts(in->buffer, "@")) {
+ if (set_perms_special(conn, in->buffer, &perms))
+ return errno;
+ send_ack(conn, XS_SET_PERMS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We must own node to do this (tools can do this too). */
+ node = get_node_canonicalized(conn, in, in->buffer, &name,
+ XS_PERM_WRITE | XS_PERM_OWNER);
+ if (!node)
+ return errno;
+
/* Unprivileged domains may not change the owner. */
if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn) &&
perms.p[0].id != node->perms.p[0].id)
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
index 47ba0916db..53f1050859 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ struct node *get_node(struct connection *conn,
struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read);
void check_store(void);
void corrupt(struct connection *conn, const char *fmt, ...);
+enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
+ const struct node_perms *perms);
/* Is this a valid node name? */
bool is_valid_nodename(const char *node);
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
index aa9942fcc2..a0d1a11c83 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ static evtchn_port_t virq_port;
xenevtchn_handle *xce_handle = NULL;
+static struct node_perms dom_release_perms;
+static struct node_perms dom_introduce_perms;
+
struct domain
{
struct list_head list;
@@ -582,6 +585,59 @@ void restore_existing_connections(void)
{
}
+static int set_dom_perms_default(struct node_perms *perms)
+{
+ perms->num = 1;
+ perms->p = talloc_array(NULL, struct xs_permissions, perms->num);
+ if (!perms->p)
+ return -1;
+ perms->p->id = 0;
+ perms->p->perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct node_perms *get_perms_special(const char *name)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(name, "@releaseDomain"))
+ return &dom_release_perms;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "@introduceDomain"))
+ return &dom_introduce_perms;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int set_perms_special(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
+ struct node_perms *perms)
+{
+ struct node_perms *p;
+
+ p = get_perms_special(name);
+ if (!p)
+ return EINVAL;
+
+ if ((perm_for_conn(conn, p) & (XS_PERM_WRITE | XS_PERM_OWNER)) !=
+ (XS_PERM_WRITE | XS_PERM_OWNER))
+ return EACCES;
+
+ p->num = perms->num;
+ talloc_free(p->p);
+ p->p = perms->p;
+ talloc_steal(NULL, perms->p);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool check_perms_special(const char *name, struct connection *conn)
+{
+ struct node_perms *p;
+
+ p = get_perms_special(name);
+ if (!p)
+ return false;
+
+ return perm_for_conn(conn, p) & XS_PERM_READ;
+}
+
static int dom0_init(void)
{
evtchn_port_t port;
@@ -603,6 +659,10 @@ static int dom0_init(void)
xenevtchn_notify(xce_handle, dom0->port);
+ if (set_dom_perms_default(&dom_release_perms) ||
+ set_dom_perms_default(&dom_introduce_perms))
+ return -1;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
index 56ae015974..259183962a 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ void domain_watch_inc(struct connection *conn);
void domain_watch_dec(struct connection *conn);
int domain_watch(struct connection *conn);
+/* Special node permission handling. */
+int set_perms_special(struct connection *conn, const char *name,
+ struct node_perms *perms);
+bool check_perms_special(const char *name, struct connection *conn);
+
/* Write rate limiting */
#define WRL_FACTOR 1000 /* for fixed-point arithmetic */
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
index 3836675459..f4e289362e 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_watch.c
@@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ void fire_watches(struct connection *conn, const void
*ctx, const char *name,
/* Create an event for each watch. */
list_for_each_entry(i, &connections, list) {
+ /* introduce/release domain watches */
+ if (check_special_event(name) && !check_perms_special(name, i))
+ continue;
+
list_for_each_entry(watch, &i->watches, list) {
if (exact) {
if (streq(name, watch->node))
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.14
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