[xen stable-4.11] x86/spec-ctrl: Protect against Speculative Code Store Bypass

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 7937627baf95e3f142639df7cb750658ca1871f3
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Mar 11 14:39:11 2021 +0000
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Jun 8 19:16:38 2021 +0100

    x86/spec-ctrl: Protect against Speculative Code Store Bypass
    
    Modern x86 processors have far-better-than-architecturally-guaranteed self
    modifying code detection.  Typically, when a write hits an instruction in
    flight, a Machine Clear occurs to flush stale content in the frontend and
    backend.
    
    For self modifying code, before a write which hits an instruction in flight
    retires, the frontend can speculatively decode and execute the old 
instruction
    stream.  Speculation of this form can suffer from type confusion in 
registers,
    and potentially leak data.
    
    Furthermore, updates are typically byte-wise, rather than atomic.  Depending
    on timing, speculation can race ahead multiple times between individual
    writes, and execute the transiently-malformed instruction stream.
    
    Xen has stubs which are used in certain cases for emulation purposes.  
Inhibit
    speculation between updating the stub and executing it.
    
    This is XSA-375 / CVE-2021-0089.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 45f59ed8865318bb0356954bad067f329677ce9e)
---
 xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c         | 2 ++
 xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
index 755f00db33..fdba01ce96 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ static io_emul_stub_t *io_emul_stub_setup(struct 
priv_op_ctxt *ctxt, u8 opcode,
     BUILD_BUG_ON(STUB_BUF_SIZE / 2 < MAX(9, /* Default emul stub */
                                          5 + IOEMUL_QUIRK_STUB_BYTES));
 
+    asm volatile ( "lfence" ::: "memory" ); /* SCSB */
+
     /* Handy function-typed pointer to the stub. */
     return (void *)stub_va;
 }
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c 
b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
index 1f0c208fc5..19594ab45d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ static inline int mkec(uint8_t e, int32_t ec, ...)
 # define invoke_stub(pre, post, constraints...) do {                    \
     stub_exn.info = (union stub_exception_token) { .raw = ~0 };         \
     stub_exn.line = __LINE__; /* Utility outweighs livepatching cost */ \
+    asm volatile ( "lfence" ::: "memory" ); /* SCSB */                  \
     asm volatile ( pre "\n\tINDIRECT_CALL %[stub]\n\t" post "\n"        \
                    ".Lret%=:\n\t"                                       \
                    ".pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"                       \
--
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