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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.15] IOMMU: generalize VT-d's tracking of mapped RMRR regions
commit 711aeb1106dafb7680093f32ea549fa5f333acf1
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed Aug 25 14:42:16 2021 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed Aug 25 14:42:16 2021 +0200
IOMMU: generalize VT-d's tracking of mapped RMRR regions
In order to re-use it elsewhere, move the logic to vendor independent
code and strip it of RMRR specifics.
Note that the prior "map" parameter gets folded into the new "p2ma" one
(which AMD IOMMU code will want to make use of), assigning alternative
meaning ("unmap") to p2m_access_x. Prepare set_identity_p2m_entry() and
p2m_get_iommu_flags() for getting passed access types other than
p2m_access_rw (in the latter case just for p2m_mmio_direct requests).
Note also that, to be on the safe side, an overlap check gets added to
the main loop of iommu_identity_mapping().
This is part of XSA-378.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xxxxxxx>
master commit: c0e19d7c6c42f0bfccccd96b4f7b03b5515e10fc
master date: 2021-08-25 14:15:57 +0200
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 2 +-
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 99 +++++--------------------------------
xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h | 9 +++-
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 35 +++++++++++--
5 files changed, 148 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index 3840f167b0..d058e5b6ed 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ int set_identity_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned
long gfn_l,
return 0;
return iommu_legacy_map(d, _dfn(gfn_l), _mfn(gfn_l),
1ul << PAGE_ORDER_4K,
- IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_writable);
+ p2m_access_to_iommu_flags(p2ma));
}
gfn_lock(p2m, gfn, 0);
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index 3fcd7208f0..3dac8ad79f 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -42,12 +42,6 @@
#include "vtd.h"
#include "../ats.h"
-struct mapped_rmrr {
- struct list_head list;
- u64 base, end;
- unsigned int count;
-};
-
/* Possible unfiltered LAPIC/MSI messages from untrusted sources? */
bool __read_mostly untrusted_msi;
@@ -1311,7 +1305,6 @@ static int intel_iommu_domain_init(struct domain *d)
struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
hd->arch.vtd.agaw = width_to_agaw(DEFAULT_DOMAIN_ADDRESS_WIDTH);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hd->arch.vtd.mapped_rmrrs);
return 0;
}
@@ -1788,17 +1781,12 @@ static void iommu_clear_root_pgtable(struct domain *d)
static void iommu_domain_teardown(struct domain *d)
{
struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
- struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr, *tmp;
const struct acpi_drhd_unit *drhd;
if ( list_empty(&acpi_drhd_units) )
return;
- list_for_each_entry_safe ( mrmrr, tmp, &hd->arch.vtd.mapped_rmrrs, list )
- {
- list_del(&mrmrr->list);
- xfree(mrmrr);
- }
+ iommu_identity_map_teardown(d);
ASSERT(!hd->arch.vtd.pgd_maddr);
@@ -1946,74 +1934,6 @@ static int __init vtd_ept_page_compatible(struct
vtd_iommu *iommu)
(ept_has_1gb(ept_cap) && opt_hap_1gb) <= cap_sps_1gb(vtd_cap);
}
-static int rmrr_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, bool_t map,
- const struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr,
- u32 flag)
-{
- unsigned long base_pfn = rmrr->base_address >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
- unsigned long end_pfn = PAGE_ALIGN_4K(rmrr->end_address) >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
- struct mapped_rmrr *mrmrr;
- struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
-
- ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
- ASSERT(rmrr->base_address < rmrr->end_address);
-
- /*
- * No need to acquire hd->arch.mapping_lock: Both insertion and removal
- * get done while holding pcidevs_lock.
- */
- list_for_each_entry( mrmrr, &hd->arch.vtd.mapped_rmrrs, list )
- {
- if ( mrmrr->base == rmrr->base_address &&
- mrmrr->end == rmrr->end_address )
- {
- int ret = 0;
-
- if ( map )
- {
- ++mrmrr->count;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ( --mrmrr->count )
- return 0;
-
- while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
- {
- if ( clear_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn) )
- ret = -ENXIO;
- base_pfn++;
- }
-
- list_del(&mrmrr->list);
- xfree(mrmrr);
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
- if ( !map )
- return -ENOENT;
-
- while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
- {
- int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2m_access_rw, flag);
-
- if ( err )
- return err;
- base_pfn++;
- }
-
- mrmrr = xmalloc(struct mapped_rmrr);
- if ( !mrmrr )
- return -ENOMEM;
- mrmrr->base = rmrr->base_address;
- mrmrr->end = rmrr->end_address;
- mrmrr->count = 1;
- list_add_tail(&mrmrr->list, &hd->arch.vtd.mapped_rmrrs);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct acpi_rmrr_unit *rmrr;
@@ -2045,7 +1965,9 @@ static int intel_iommu_add_device(u8 devfn, struct
pci_dev *pdev)
* Since RMRRs are always reserved in the e820 map for the hardware
* domain, there shouldn't be a conflict.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 1, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = iommu_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, p2m_access_rw,
+ rmrr->base_address, rmrr->end_address,
+ 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX, "d%d: RMRR mapping failed\n",
pdev->domain->domain_id);
@@ -2090,7 +2012,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_remove_device(u8 devfn, struct
pci_dev *pdev)
* Any flag is nothing to clear these mappings but here
* its always safe and strict to set 0.
*/
- rmrr_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, 0, rmrr, 0);
+ iommu_identity_mapping(pdev->domain, p2m_access_x, rmrr->base_address,
+ rmrr->end_address, 0);
}
return domain_context_unmap(pdev->domain, devfn, pdev);
@@ -2289,7 +2212,8 @@ static void __hwdom_init setup_hwdom_rmrr(struct domain
*d)
* domain, there shouldn't be a conflict. So its always safe and
* strict to set 0.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = iommu_identity_mapping(d, p2m_access_rw, rmrr->base_address,
+ rmrr->end_address, 0);
if ( ret )
dprintk(XENLOG_ERR VTDPREFIX,
"IOMMU: mapping reserved region failed\n");
@@ -2460,7 +2384,9 @@ static int reassign_device_ownership(
* Any RMRR flag is always ignored when remove a device,
* but its always safe and strict to set 0.
*/
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(source, 0, rmrr, 0);
+ ret = iommu_identity_mapping(source, p2m_access_x,
+ rmrr->base_address,
+ rmrr->end_address, 0);
if ( ret != -ENOENT )
return ret;
}
@@ -2556,7 +2482,8 @@ static int intel_iommu_assign_device(
PCI_BUS(bdf) == bus &&
PCI_DEVFN2(bdf) == devfn )
{
- ret = rmrr_identity_mapping(d, 1, rmrr, flag);
+ ret = iommu_identity_mapping(d, p2m_access_rw, rmrr->base_address,
+ rmrr->end_address, flag);
if ( ret )
{
int rc;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
index b90bb31bfe..21c14fab66 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/x86/iommu.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ int arch_iommu_domain_init(struct domain *d)
INIT_PAGE_LIST_HEAD(&hd->arch.pgtables.list);
spin_lock_init(&hd->arch.pgtables.lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hd->arch.identity_maps);
return 0;
}
@@ -158,6 +159,99 @@ void arch_iommu_domain_destroy(struct domain *d)
page_list_empty(&dom_iommu(d)->arch.pgtables.list));
}
+struct identity_map {
+ struct list_head list;
+ paddr_t base, end;
+ p2m_access_t access;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+
+int iommu_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, p2m_access_t p2ma,
+ paddr_t base, paddr_t end,
+ unsigned int flag)
+{
+ unsigned long base_pfn = base >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ unsigned long end_pfn = PAGE_ALIGN_4K(end) >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K;
+ struct identity_map *map;
+ struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
+
+ ASSERT(pcidevs_locked());
+ ASSERT(base < end);
+
+ /*
+ * No need to acquire hd->arch.mapping_lock: Both insertion and removal
+ * get done while holding pcidevs_lock.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry( map, &hd->arch.identity_maps, list )
+ {
+ if ( map->base == base && map->end == end )
+ {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ( p2ma != p2m_access_x )
+ {
+ if ( map->access != p2ma )
+ return -EADDRINUSE;
+ ++map->count;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ( --map->count )
+ return 0;
+
+ while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
+ {
+ if ( clear_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn) )
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ base_pfn++;
+ }
+
+ list_del(&map->list);
+ xfree(map);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ( end >= map->base && map->end >= base )
+ return -EADDRINUSE;
+ }
+
+ if ( p2ma == p2m_access_x )
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ while ( base_pfn < end_pfn )
+ {
+ int err = set_identity_p2m_entry(d, base_pfn, p2ma, flag);
+
+ if ( err )
+ return err;
+ base_pfn++;
+ }
+
+ map = xmalloc(struct identity_map);
+ if ( !map )
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ map->base = base;
+ map->end = end;
+ map->access = p2ma;
+ map->count = 1;
+ list_add_tail(&map->list, &hd->arch.identity_maps);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void iommu_identity_map_teardown(struct domain *d)
+{
+ struct domain_iommu *hd = dom_iommu(d);
+ struct identity_map *map, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe ( map, tmp, &hd->arch.identity_maps, list )
+ {
+ list_del(&map->list);
+ xfree(map);
+ }
+}
+
static bool __hwdom_init hwdom_iommu_map(const struct domain *d,
unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long max_pfn)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h
index 970eb06ffa..33f11f33de 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/iommu.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <xen/errno.h>
#include <xen/list.h>
+#include <xen/mem_access.h>
#include <xen/spinlock.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -51,13 +52,14 @@ struct arch_iommu
spinlock_t lock;
} pgtables;
+ struct list_head identity_maps;
+
union {
/* Intel VT-d */
struct {
uint64_t pgd_maddr; /* io page directory machine address */
unsigned int agaw; /* adjusted guest address width, 0 is level 2
30-bit */
uint64_t iommu_bitmap; /* bitmap of iommu(s) that the domain uses
*/
- struct list_head mapped_rmrrs;
} vtd;
/* AMD IOMMU */
struct {
@@ -123,6 +125,11 @@ static inline void iommu_disable_x2apic(void)
iommu_ops.disable_x2apic();
}
+int iommu_identity_mapping(struct domain *d, p2m_access_t p2ma,
+ paddr_t base, paddr_t end,
+ unsigned int flag);
+void iommu_identity_map_teardown(struct domain *d);
+
extern bool untrusted_msi;
int pi_update_irte(const struct pi_desc *pi_desc, const struct pirq *pirq,
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
index b3168f426b..6a7bb40fdb 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h
@@ -912,6 +912,34 @@ struct p2m_domain *p2m_get_altp2m(struct vcpu *v);
static inline void p2m_altp2m_check(struct vcpu *v, uint16_t idx) {}
#endif
+/* p2m access to IOMMU flags */
+static inline unsigned int p2m_access_to_iommu_flags(p2m_access_t p2ma)
+{
+ switch ( p2ma )
+ {
+ case p2m_access_rw:
+ case p2m_access_rwx:
+ return IOMMUF_readable | IOMMUF_writable;
+
+ case p2m_access_r:
+ case p2m_access_rx:
+ case p2m_access_rx2rw:
+ return IOMMUF_readable;
+
+ case p2m_access_w:
+ case p2m_access_wx:
+ return IOMMUF_writable;
+
+ case p2m_access_n:
+ case p2m_access_x:
+ case p2m_access_n2rwx:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* p2m type to IOMMU flags
*/
@@ -933,9 +961,10 @@ static inline unsigned int p2m_get_iommu_flags(p2m_type_t
p2mt,
flags = IOMMUF_readable;
break;
case p2m_mmio_direct:
- flags = IOMMUF_readable;
- if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn)) )
- flags |= IOMMUF_writable;
+ flags = p2m_access_to_iommu_flags(p2ma);
+ if ( (flags & IOMMUF_writable) &&
+ rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn)) )
+ flags &= ~IOMMUF_writable;
break;
default:
flags = 0;
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.15
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