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[xen master] xen/arm: Taint Xen on incompatible DCZID values



commit ef17eb9d3a89bea120ba3949b73cd482c6173648
Author:     Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Sep 16 07:25:39 2021 +0100
Commit:     Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Sep 16 14:15:51 2021 -0700

    xen/arm: Taint Xen on incompatible DCZID values
    
    Use arm64 cpu feature sanitization to TAINT Xen if different DCZID values
    are found (ftr_dczid is using only STRICT method).
    In this case actual memory being cleaned by DC ZVA operations would be
    different depending on the cores which could make a guest zeroing too
    much or too little memory if it is merged between CPUs.
    
    We could, on processors supporting it, trap access to DCZID_EL0 register
    using HFGRTR_EL2 register but this would not solve the case where a
    process is being migrated during a copy or if it cached the value of the
    register.
    
    Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/arm/arm64/cpufeature.c  | 14 +++++++++++---
 xen/arch/arm/cpufeature.c        |  2 ++
 xen/include/asm-arm/cpufeature.h |  8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/cpufeature.c b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/cpufeature.c
index 58596495a8..d4679f5df3 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/arm64/cpufeature.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/arm64/cpufeature.c
@@ -329,14 +329,11 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_mvfr2[] = {
        ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
-#if 0
-/* TODO: handle this when sanitizing cache related registers */
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_dczid[] = {
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, DCZID_DZP_SHIFT, 1, 
1),
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, DCZID_BS_SHIFT, 
4, 0),
        ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
-#endif
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_isar0[] = {
        ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 
ID_ISAR0_DIVIDE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -598,6 +595,17 @@ void update_system_features(const struct cpuinfo_arm *new)
 
        SANITIZE_ID_REG(zfr64, 0, aa64zfr0);
 
+       /*
+        * Comment from Linux:
+        * Userspace may perform DC ZVA instructions. Mismatched block sizes
+        * could result in too much or too little memory being zeroed if a
+        * process is preempted and migrated between CPUs.
+        *
+        * ftr_dczid is using STRICT comparison so we will taint Xen if 
different
+        * values are found.
+        */
+       SANITIZE_REG(dczid, 0, dczid);
+
        if ( cpu_feature64_has_el0_32(&system_cpuinfo) )
        {
                SANITIZE_ID_REG(pfr32, 0, pfr0);
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/cpufeature.c b/xen/arch/arm/cpufeature.c
index f600a611bd..113f20f601 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/cpufeature.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/cpufeature.c
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_arm *c)
 
     c->zfr64.bits[0] = READ_SYSREG(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1);
 
+    c->dczid.bits[0] = READ_SYSREG(DCZID_EL0);
+
     aarch32_el0 = cpu_feature64_has_el0_32(c);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/cpufeature.h
index 52cb3133e0..5219fd3bab 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-arm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/cpufeature.h
@@ -259,6 +259,14 @@ struct cpuinfo_arm {
         register_t bits[1];
     } zfr64;
 
+    /*
+     * DCZID is only used to check for incoherent values between cores
+     * and taint Xen in this case
+     */
+    struct {
+        register_t bits[1];
+    } dczid;
+
 #endif
 
     /*
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master



 


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