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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.15] x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist
commit cb7d7aa4c1bc40c987afdf73ee7e65689d2a24af
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Oct 15 11:01:32 2021 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Oct 15 11:01:32 2021 +0200
x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist
The opencoded legacy Memory Disambiguation logic in init_amd() neglected
Fam19h for the Zen3 microarchitecture. Further more, all Zen2 based system
have the architectural MSR_SPEC_CTRL and the SSBD bit within it, so
shouldn't
be using MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG.
Implement the algorithm given in AMD's SSBD whitepaper, and leave a
printk_once() behind in the case that no controls can be found.
This now means that a user explicitly choosing `spec-ctrl=ssbd` will
properly
turn off Memory Disambiguation on Fam19h/Zen3 systems.
This still remains a single system-wide setting (for now), and is not
context
switched between vCPUs. As such, it doesn't interact with Intel's use of
MSR_SPEC_CTRL and default_xen_spec_ctrl (yet).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
master commit: 2a4e6c4e4bea2e0bb720418c331ee28ff9c7632e
master date: 2021-09-08 14:16:19 +0100
---
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c | 9 +------
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 5 +++-
4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
index db6916c1fd..10495aca35 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -642,6 +642,56 @@ void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
}
+/*
+ * Refer to the AMD Speculative Store Bypass whitepaper:
+ *
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
+ */
+void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int bit = -1;
+
+ if (cpu_has_ssb_no)
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (c->x86) {
+ case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+ case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+ case 0x17:
+ case 0x18: bit = 10; break;
+ }
+
+ if (bit >= 0) {
+ uint64_t val, mask = 1ull << bit;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
+ ({
+ val &= ~mask;
+ if (opt_ssbd)
+ val |= mask;
+ false;
+ }) ||
+ wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
+ ({
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val);
+ (val & mask) != (opt_ssbd * mask);
+ }))
+ bit = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (bit < 0)
+ printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n");
+}
+
static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 l, h;
@@ -718,24 +768,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
c->x86_capability);
}
- /*
- * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation
- * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR.
- */
- if (opt_ssbd) {
- int bit = -1;
-
- switch (c->x86) {
- case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
- case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
- case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
- }
-
- if (bit >= 0 && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) {
- value |= 1ull << bit;
- wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
- }
- }
+ amd_init_ssbd(c);
/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
index 1992596d1b..2550957801 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ extern bool detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
void amd_log_freq(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
index 46293f1f36..ccfa27201d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -59,14 +59,7 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH,
c->x86_capability);
- /*
- * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation
- * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR.
- */
- if (opt_ssbd && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) {
- value |= 1ull << 10;
- wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
- }
+ amd_init_ssbd(c);
/* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index a7953e43bc..e0e468783c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -326,20 +326,23 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk,
uint64_t caps)
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL"
: "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA"
: "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) ? " SKIP_L1DFL"
: "",
+ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSB_NO)) ||
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO"
: "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO) ? " MDS_NO"
: "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO) ? " TAA_NO"
: "");
/* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */
- printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ||
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBPB"
: "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS"
: "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP"
: "",
+ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ||
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) ? " SSBD"
: "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH)) ? " L1D_FLUSH"
: "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) ? " MD_CLEAR"
: "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) ? " SRBDS_CTRL"
: "",
+ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) ? " VIRT_SSBD"
: "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? " TSX_CTRL"
: "");
/* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.15
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