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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.15] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT
commit 368cffb5be40a8b1d97ea5a557c578ae30b65134
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Nov 1 16:13:29 2021 +0000
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Mar 25 17:10:38 2022 +0000
x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT
CET-SS and CET-IBT can be independently controlled, so the configuration of
MSR_S_CET can't be constant any more.
Introduce xen_msr_s_cet_value(), mostly because I don't fancy
writing/maintaining that logic in assembly. Use this in the 3 paths which
alter MSR_S_CET when both features are potentially active.
To active CET-IBT, we only need CR4.CET and MSR_S_CET.ENDBR_EN. This is
common with the CET-SS setup, so reorder the operations to set up CR4 and
MSR_S_CET for any nonzero result from xen_msr_s_cet_value(), and set up
MSR_PL0_SSP and SSP if SHSTK_EN was also set.
Adjust the crash path to disable CET-IBT too.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit 311434bfc9d10615adbd340d7fb08c05cd14f4c7)
---
xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S | 30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
xen/arch/x86/crash.c | 4 ++--
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
index 15052c300f..3855ff1ddb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
@@ -63,7 +63,26 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
pushq %rax
lretq
1:
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+ call xen_msr_s_cet_value
+ test %eax, %eax
+ jz .L_cet_done
+
+ /* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
+ mov $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
+ xor %edx, %edx
+ wrmsr
+
+ /* Enable CR4.CET. */
+ mov $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
+ mov %rcx, %cr4
+
+ /* WARNING! call/ret now fatal (iff SHSTK) until SETSSBSY loads SSP */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK)
+ test $CET_SHSTK_EN, %al
+ jz .L_cet_done
+
/*
* Restoring SSP is a little complicated, because we are intercepting
* an in-use shadow stack. Write a temporary token under the stack,
@@ -71,14 +90,6 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
* reset MSR_PL0_SSP to its usual value and pop the temporary token.
*/
mov saved_ssp(%rip), %rdi
- cmpq $1, %rdi
- je .L_shstk_done
-
- /* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
- mov $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
- xor %edx, %edx
- mov $CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN, %eax
- wrmsr
/* Construct the temporary supervisor token under SSP. */
sub $8, %rdi
@@ -90,10 +101,6 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
mov %edi, %eax
wrmsr
- /* Enable CET. MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE is set up later in
load_system_tables(). */
- mov $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ebx
- mov %rbx, %cr4
-
/* Write the temporary token onto the shadow stack, and activate it. */
wrssq %rdi, (%rdi)
setssbsy
@@ -106,8 +113,9 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
/* Pop the temporary token off the stack. */
mov $2, %eax
incsspd %eax
-.L_shstk_done:
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
+.L_cet_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK || CONFIG_XEN_IBT */
call load_system_tables
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S b/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
index d61048c583..94b1d984cf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
@@ -30,18 +30,27 @@ ENTRY(__high_start)
test %ebx,%ebx
jz .L_bsp
- /* APs. Set up shadow stacks before entering C. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
- testl $cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK), \
- CPUINFO_FEATURE_OFFSET(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK) +
boot_cpu_data(%rip)
- je .L_ap_shstk_done
+ /* APs. Set up CET before entering C properly. */
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+ call xen_msr_s_cet_value
+ test %eax, %eax
+ jz .L_ap_cet_done
/* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
mov $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
xor %edx, %edx
- mov $CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN, %eax
wrmsr
+ /* Enable CR4.CET. */
+ mov $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
+ mov %rcx, %cr4
+
+ /* WARNING! call/ret now fatal (iff SHSTK) until SETSSBSY loads SSP */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK)
+ test $CET_SHSTK_EN, %al
+ jz .L_ap_cet_done
+
/* Derive MSR_PL0_SSP from %rsp (token written when stack is
allocated). */
mov $MSR_PL0_SSP, %ecx
mov %rsp, %rdx
@@ -51,13 +60,12 @@ ENTRY(__high_start)
or $(PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT + 1) * PAGE_SIZE - 8, %eax
wrmsr
- /* Enable CET. MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE is set up later in
load_system_tables(). */
- mov $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
- mov %rcx, %cr4
setssbsy
-#endif
-.L_ap_shstk_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
+.L_ap_cet_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK || CONFIG_XEN_IBT */
+
call start_secondary
BUG /* start_secondary() shouldn't return. */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
index 0611b4fb9b..cfc6bdab7b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(void)
/* Reset CPUID masking and faulting to the host's default. */
ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
- /* Disable shadow stacks. */
- if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
+ /* Disable CET. */
+ if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk || cpu_has_xen_ibt )
{
wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, 0);
write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 467dcfc4cf..a9cc6c2955 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -660,6 +660,21 @@ static void noreturn init_done(void)
startup_cpu_idle_loop();
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+/*
+ * Used by AP and S3 asm code to calcualte the appropriate MSR_S_CET setting.
+ * Do not use on the BSP before reinit_bsp_stack(), or it may turn SHSTK on
+ * too early.
+ */
+unsigned int xen_msr_s_cet_value(void)
+{
+ return ((cpu_has_xen_shstk ? CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN : 0) |
+ (cpu_has_xen_ibt ? CET_ENDBR_EN : 0));
+}
+#else
+unsigned int xen_msr_s_cet_value(void); /* To avoid ifdefary */
+#endif
+
/* Reinitalise all state referring to the old virtual address of the stack. */
static void __init noreturn reinit_bsp_stack(void)
{
@@ -683,7 +698,7 @@ static void __init noreturn reinit_bsp_stack(void)
{
wrmsrl(MSR_PL0_SSP,
(unsigned long)stack + (PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT + 1) * PAGE_SIZE -
8);
- wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, xen_msr_s_cet_value());
asm volatile ("setssbsy" ::: "memory");
}
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index e2d4ebead0..3ea30aab75 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@
#define MSR_S_CET 0x000006a2
#define CET_SHSTK_EN (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
#define CET_WRSS_EN (_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
+#define CET_ENDBR_EN (_AC(1, ULL) << 2)
#define MSR_PL0_SSP 0x000006a4
#define MSR_PL1_SSP 0x000006a5
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.15
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