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[xen stable-4.14] x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT



commit 9bdbbf1b46e465adcd066a88d33d47824d2f788c
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Mon Nov 1 16:13:29 2021 +0000
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Mar 25 17:11:55 2022 +0000

    x86/setup: Rework MSR_S_CET handling for CET-IBT
    
    CET-SS and CET-IBT can be independently controlled, so the configuration of
    MSR_S_CET can't be constant any more.
    
    Introduce xen_msr_s_cet_value(), mostly because I don't fancy
    writing/maintaining that logic in assembly.  Use this in the 3 paths which
    alter MSR_S_CET when both features are potentially active.
    
    To active CET-IBT, we only need CR4.CET and MSR_S_CET.ENDBR_EN.  This is
    common with the CET-SS setup, so reorder the operations to set up CR4 and
    MSR_S_CET for any nonzero result from xen_msr_s_cet_value(), and set up
    MSR_PL0_SSP and SSP if SHSTK_EN was also set.
    
    Adjust the crash path to disable CET-IBT too.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 311434bfc9d10615adbd340d7fb08c05cd14f4c7)
---
 xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S      | 30 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
 xen/arch/x86/crash.c            |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/setup.c            | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h |  1 +
 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
index 15052c300f..3855ff1ddb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/wakeup_prot.S
@@ -63,7 +63,26 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
         pushq   %rax
         lretq
 1:
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+        call    xen_msr_s_cet_value
+        test    %eax, %eax
+        jz      .L_cet_done
+
+        /* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
+        mov     $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
+        xor     %edx, %edx
+        wrmsr
+
+        /* Enable CR4.CET. */
+        mov     $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
+        mov     %rcx, %cr4
+
+        /* WARNING! call/ret now fatal (iff SHSTK) until SETSSBSY loads SSP */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK)
+        test    $CET_SHSTK_EN, %al
+        jz      .L_cet_done
+
         /*
          * Restoring SSP is a little complicated, because we are intercepting
          * an in-use shadow stack.  Write a temporary token under the stack,
@@ -71,14 +90,6 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
          * reset MSR_PL0_SSP to its usual value and pop the temporary token.
          */
         mov     saved_ssp(%rip), %rdi
-        cmpq    $1, %rdi
-        je      .L_shstk_done
-
-        /* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
-        mov     $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
-        xor     %edx, %edx
-        mov     $CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN, %eax
-        wrmsr
 
         /* Construct the temporary supervisor token under SSP. */
         sub     $8, %rdi
@@ -90,10 +101,6 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
         mov     %edi, %eax
         wrmsr
 
-        /* Enable CET.  MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE is set up later in 
load_system_tables(). */
-        mov     $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ebx
-        mov     %rbx, %cr4
-
         /* Write the temporary token onto the shadow stack, and activate it. */
         wrssq   %rdi, (%rdi)
         setssbsy
@@ -106,8 +113,9 @@ ENTRY(s3_resume)
         /* Pop the temporary token off the stack. */
         mov     $2, %eax
         incsspd %eax
-.L_shstk_done:
-#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
+.L_cet_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK || CONFIG_XEN_IBT */
 
         call    load_system_tables
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S b/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
index d61048c583..94b1d984cf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/x86_64.S
@@ -30,18 +30,27 @@ ENTRY(__high_start)
         test    %ebx,%ebx
         jz      .L_bsp
 
-        /* APs.  Set up shadow stacks before entering C. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
-        testl   $cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK), \
-                CPUINFO_FEATURE_OFFSET(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK) + 
boot_cpu_data(%rip)
-        je      .L_ap_shstk_done
+        /* APs.  Set up CET before entering C properly. */
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+        call    xen_msr_s_cet_value
+        test    %eax, %eax
+        jz      .L_ap_cet_done
 
         /* Set up MSR_S_CET. */
         mov     $MSR_S_CET, %ecx
         xor     %edx, %edx
-        mov     $CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN, %eax
         wrmsr
 
+        /* Enable CR4.CET. */
+        mov     $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
+        mov     %rcx, %cr4
+
+        /* WARNING! call/ret now fatal (iff SHSTK) until SETSSBSY loads SSP */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK)
+        test    $CET_SHSTK_EN, %al
+        jz      .L_ap_cet_done
+
         /* Derive MSR_PL0_SSP from %rsp (token written when stack is 
allocated). */
         mov     $MSR_PL0_SSP, %ecx
         mov     %rsp, %rdx
@@ -51,13 +60,12 @@ ENTRY(__high_start)
         or      $(PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT + 1) * PAGE_SIZE - 8, %eax
         wrmsr
 
-        /* Enable CET.  MSR_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE is set up later in 
load_system_tables(). */
-        mov     $XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 | X86_CR4_CET, %ecx
-        mov     %rcx, %cr4
         setssbsy
-#endif
 
-.L_ap_shstk_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK */
+.L_ap_cet_done:
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK || CONFIG_XEN_IBT */
+
         call    start_secondary
         BUG     /* start_secondary() shouldn't return. */
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
index 0611b4fb9b..cfc6bdab7b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/crash.c
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(void)
     /* Reset CPUID masking and faulting to the host's default. */
     ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL);
 
-    /* Disable shadow stacks. */
-    if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk )
+    /* Disable CET. */
+    if ( cpu_has_xen_shstk || cpu_has_xen_ibt )
     {
         wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, 0);
         write_cr4(read_cr4() & ~X86_CR4_CET);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index 297845d691..b80b933ddb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -654,6 +654,21 @@ static void noinline init_done(void)
     startup_cpu_idle_loop();
 }
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) || defined(CONFIG_XEN_IBT)
+/*
+ * Used by AP and S3 asm code to calcualte the appropriate MSR_S_CET setting.
+ * Do not use on the BSP before reinit_bsp_stack(), or it may turn SHSTK on
+ * too early.
+ */
+unsigned int xen_msr_s_cet_value(void)
+{
+    return ((cpu_has_xen_shstk ? CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN : 0) |
+            (cpu_has_xen_ibt   ? CET_ENDBR_EN : 0));
+}
+#else
+unsigned int xen_msr_s_cet_value(void); /* To avoid ifdefary */
+#endif
+
 /* Reinitalise all state referring to the old virtual address of the stack. */
 static void __init noreturn reinit_bsp_stack(void)
 {
@@ -677,7 +692,7 @@ static void __init noreturn reinit_bsp_stack(void)
     {
         wrmsrl(MSR_PL0_SSP,
                (unsigned long)stack + (PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT + 1) * PAGE_SIZE - 
8);
-        wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN | CET_WRSS_EN);
+        wrmsrl(MSR_S_CET, xen_msr_s_cet_value());
         asm volatile ("setssbsy" ::: "memory");
     }
 
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index 93f96e2ace..7a39d94b9a 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
 #define MSR_S_CET                           0x000006a2
 #define  CET_SHSTK_EN                       (_AC(1, ULL) <<  0)
 #define  CET_WRSS_EN                        (_AC(1, ULL) <<  1)
+#define  CET_ENDBR_EN                       (_AC(1, ULL) <<  2)
 
 #define MSR_PL0_SSP                         0x000006a4
 #define MSR_PL1_SSP                         0x000006a5
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.14



 


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