[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.13] x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist
commit d43b47eb6a268aab69dbd87e1219aad4d3775f3d Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Oct 15 11:15:14 2021 +0200 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Jul 12 16:33:19 2022 +0100 x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist The opencoded legacy Memory Disambiguation logic in init_amd() neglected Fam19h for the Zen3 microarchitecture. Further more, all Zen2 based system have the architectural MSR_SPEC_CTRL and the SSBD bit within it, so shouldn't be using MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG. Implement the algorithm given in AMD's SSBD whitepaper, and leave a printk_once() behind in the case that no controls can be found. This now means that a user explicitly choosing `spec-ctrl=ssbd` will properly turn off Memory Disambiguation on Fam19h/Zen3 systems. This still remains a single system-wide setting (for now), and is not context switched between vCPUs. As such, it doesn't interact with Intel's use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL and default_xen_spec_ctrl (yet). Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 2a4e6c4e4bea2e0bb720418c331ee28ff9c7632e) --- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c | 9 +------ xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 5 +++- 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index aa1b9d0dda..de0389810b 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -540,6 +540,56 @@ void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) ctxt_switch_levelling(NULL); } +/* + * Refer to the AMD Speculative Store Bypass whitepaper: + * https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf + */ +void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + int bit = -1; + + if (cpu_has_ssb_no) + return; + + if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) { + wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0); + return; + } + + if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) { + wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0); + return; + } + + switch (c->x86) { + case 0x15: bit = 54; break; + case 0x16: bit = 33; break; + case 0x17: + case 0x18: bit = 10; break; + } + + if (bit >= 0) { + uint64_t val, mask = 1ull << bit; + + if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) || + ({ + val &= ~mask; + if (opt_ssbd) + val |= mask; + false; + }) || + wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) || + ({ + rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val); + (val & mask) != (opt_ssbd * mask); + })) + bit = -1; + } + + if (bit < 0) + printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n"); +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 l, h; @@ -616,24 +666,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_capability); } - /* - * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation - * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR. - */ - if (opt_ssbd) { - int bit = -1; - - switch (c->x86) { - case 0x15: bit = 54; break; - case 0x16: bit = 33; break; - case 0x17: bit = 10; break; - } - - if (bit >= 0 && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) { - value |= 1ull << bit; - wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value); - } - } + amd_init_ssbd(c); /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h index c2f4d9a06a..23ccd66115 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h @@ -19,3 +19,4 @@ extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); extern bool detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); +void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c index 9ab7aa8622..b769e8ad90 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c @@ -59,14 +59,7 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_DISPATCH, c->x86_capability); - /* - * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation - * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR. - */ - if (opt_ssbd && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) { - value |= 1ull << 10; - wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value); - } + amd_init_ssbd(c); /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index fec145a7b9..be3528c28e 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) ? " SKIP_L1DFL" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSB_NO)) || (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO) ? " MDS_NO" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO) ? " TAA_NO" : "", @@ -339,15 +340,17 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) (caps & ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO) ? " PSDP_NO" : ""); /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */ - printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) || (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBPB" : "", (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS" : "", (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) || (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) ? " SSBD" : "", (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH)) ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "", (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "", (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) ? " SRBDS_CTRL" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) ? " VIRT_SSBD" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? " TSX_CTRL" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR) ? " FB_CLEAR" : "", (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) ? " FB_CLEAR_CTRL" : ""); -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.13
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