[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.13] x86/spec-ctrl: Enable Zen2 chickenbit
commit 3feba68e15d3045db99ab417ad1fcfde2966e22d Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Tue Mar 15 18:30:25 2022 +0000 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Jul 12 16:33:19 2022 +0100 x86/spec-ctrl: Enable Zen2 chickenbit ... as instructed in the Branch Type Confusion whitepaper. This is part of XSA-407. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 9deaf2d932f08c16c6b96a1c426e4b1142c0cdbe) --- xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c | 6 ++++++ xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index a2041e5138..e9530d581b 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -590,6 +590,31 @@ void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n"); } +/* + * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. + * + * Refer to the AMD Branch Type Confusion whitepaper: + * https://XXX + * + * Setting this unnamed bit supposedly causes prediction information on + * non-branch instructions to be ignored. It is to be set unilaterally in + * newer microcode. + * + * This chickenbit is something unrelated on Zen1, and Zen1 vs Zen2 isn't a + * simple model number comparison, so use STIBP as a heuristic to separate the + * two uarches in Fam17h(AMD)/18h(Hygon). + */ +void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void) +{ + uint64_t val, chickenbit = 1 << 1; + + if (cpu_has_hypervisor || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) + return; + + if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val) == 0 && !(val & chickenbit)) + wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val | chickenbit); +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u32 l, h; @@ -668,6 +693,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) amd_init_ssbd(c); + if (c->x86 == 0x17) + amd_init_spectral_chicken(); + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h index 23ccd66115..680b515b3c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h @@ -20,3 +20,4 @@ extern bool detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); +void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c index b769e8ad90..c500485dde 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) amd_init_ssbd(c); + /* + * TODO: Check heuristic safety with Hygon first + if (c->x86 == 0x18) + amd_init_spectral_chicken(); + */ + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h index 20653bd660..7b8a9c2951 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG 0xc0011029 #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE (_AC(1, ULL) << 1) +#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 0xc00110e3 #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011027 #define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011019 -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.13
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