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[xen stable-4.13] x86/spec-ctrl: Rename SCF_ist_wrmsr to SCF_ist_sc_msr



commit ba3367292342e709b67e2efc0b1958ee34642b3f
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Jun 28 14:36:56 2022 +0100
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Jul 12 16:33:19 2022 +0100

    x86/spec-ctrl: Rename SCF_ist_wrmsr to SCF_ist_sc_msr
    
    We are about to introduce SCF_ist_ibpb, at which point SCF_ist_wrmsr becomes
    ambiguous.
    
    No functional change.
    
    This is part of XSA-407.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 76d6a36f645dfdbad8830559d4d52caf36efc75e)
---
 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c            | 6 +++---
 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h     | 4 ++--
 xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 8 ++++----
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 3030400a72..deab5d990c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -1064,7 +1064,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
     {
         if ( opt_msr_sc_pv )
         {
-            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr;
+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr;
             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV);
         }
 
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
              * Xen's value is not restored atomically.  An early NMI hitting
              * the VMExit path needs to restore Xen's value for safety.
              */
-            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr;
+            default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr;
             setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM);
         }
     }
@@ -1088,7 +1088,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
          * on real hardware matches the availability of MSR_SPEC_CTRL in the
          * first place.
          *
-         * No need for SCF_ist_wrmsr because Xen's value is restored
+         * No need for SCF_ist_sc_msr because Xen's value is restored
          * atomically WRT NMIs in the VMExit path.
          *
          * TODO: Adjust cpu_has_svm_spec_ctrl to be usable earlier on boot.
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
index a7b1b8f590..3b2cd42413 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
  * context switched per domain, and some inhibited in the S3 path.
  */
 #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0)
-#define SCF_ist_wrmsr  (1 << 1)
+#define SCF_ist_sc_msr (1 << 1)
 #define SCF_ist_rsb    (1 << 2)
 #define SCF_verw       (1 << 3)
 
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
  * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has
  * been reloaded.
  */
-#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_wrmsr)
+#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr)
 
 /*
  * Some speculative protections are per-domain.  These settings are merged
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h 
b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
index 12b3111ebd..3e9d6bd114 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h
@@ -273,8 +273,8 @@
 
 .L\@_skip_rsb:
 
-    test $SCF_ist_wrmsr, %al
-    jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr
+    test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %al
+    jz .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl
 
     xor %edx, %edx
     testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp)
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise):
      * to speculate around the WRMSR.  As a result, we need a dispatch
      * serialising instruction in the else clause.
      */
-.L\@_skip_wrmsr:
+.L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl:
     lfence
     UNLIKELY_END(\@_serialise)
 .endm
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise):
  * Requires %rbx=stack_end
  * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx
  */
-    testb $SCF_ist_wrmsr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx)
+    testb $SCF_ist_sc_msr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx)
     jz .L\@_skip
 
     DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.13



 


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