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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen master] Temporarily revert "amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using legacy SSBD"
commit c254f3b45c7fc8b050a6b6290d9bd7203417b994
Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Aug 19 20:15:22 2022 +0100
Commit: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Aug 19 20:15:22 2022 +0100
Temporarily revert "amd/msr: implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL for HVM guests using
legacy SSBD"
A person tagged in commit 646589ac148a2ff6bb222a6081b4d7b13ee468c0
claims the tag is in accurate; revert this commit so that we can
re-commit it again with the tag corrected.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
CHANGELOG.md | 1 -
xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 121 ++++++-----------------------------------
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 --
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h | 4 --
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 4 +-
5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 5e4bae5f35..a87a193e15 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ The format is based on [Keep a
Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/)
### Added / support upgraded
- IOMMU superpage support on x86, affecting PV guests as well as HVM/PVH ones
when they don't share page tables with the CPU (HAP / EPT / NPT).
- - Support VIRT_SSBD feature for HVM guests on AMD.
### Removed / support downgraded
- dropped support for the (x86-only) "vesa-mtrr" and "vesa-remap" command
line options
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
index 98c52d0686..d5f8e5e899 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ boolean_param("allow_unsafe", opt_allow_unsafe);
/* Signal whether the ACPI C1E quirk is required. */
bool __read_mostly amd_acpi_c1e_quirk;
-bool __ro_after_init amd_legacy_ssbd;
static inline int rdmsr_amd_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned int *lo,
unsigned int *hi)
@@ -686,10 +685,23 @@ void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Refer to the AMD Speculative Store Bypass whitepaper:
*
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
*/
-static bool set_legacy_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool enable)
+void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
int bit = -1;
+ if (cpu_has_ssb_no)
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) {
+ /* Handled by common MSR_SPEC_CTRL logic */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
switch (c->x86) {
case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
@@ -703,119 +715,20 @@ static bool set_legacy_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c,
bool enable)
if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
({
val &= ~mask;
- if (enable)
+ if (opt_ssbd)
val |= mask;
false;
}) ||
wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
({
rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val);
- (val & mask) != (enable * mask);
+ (val & mask) != (opt_ssbd * mask);
}))
bit = -1;
}
- return bit >= 0;
-}
-
-void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-{
- if (cpu_has_ssb_no)
- return;
-
- if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) {
- /* Handled by common MSR_SPEC_CTRL logic */
- return;
- }
-
- if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) {
- wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
- return;
- }
-
- if (!set_legacy_ssbd(c, opt_ssbd)) {
+ if (bit < 0)
printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n");
- if (amd_legacy_ssbd)
- panic("CPU feature mismatch: no legacy SSBD\n");
- } else if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
- amd_legacy_ssbd = true;
-}
-
-static struct ssbd_ls_cfg {
- bool locked;
- unsigned int count;
-} __cacheline_aligned *ssbd_ls_cfg;
-static unsigned int __ro_after_init ssbd_max_cores;
-#define AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS 2
-
-bool __init amd_setup_legacy_ssbd(void)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x18) ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings <= 1)
- return true;
-
- /*
- * One could be forgiven for thinking that c->x86_max_cores is the
- * correct value to use here.
- *
- * However, that value is derived from the current configuration, and
- * c->cpu_core_id is sparse on all but the top end CPUs. Derive
- * max_cpus from ApicIdCoreIdSize which will cover any sparseness.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
- ssbd_max_cores = 1u << MASK_EXTR(cpuid_ecx(0x80000008), 0xf000);
- ssbd_max_cores /= boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings;
- }
- if (!ssbd_max_cores)
- return false;
-
- ssbd_ls_cfg = xzalloc_array(struct ssbd_ls_cfg,
- ssbd_max_cores * AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS);
- if (!ssbd_ls_cfg)
- return false;
-
- if (opt_ssbd)
- for (i = 0; i < ssbd_max_cores * AMD_FAM17H_MAX_SOCKETS; i++)
- /* Set initial state, applies to any (hotplug) CPU. */
- ssbd_ls_cfg[i].count = boot_cpu_data.x86_num_siblings;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-/*
- * Executed from GIF==0 context: avoid using BUG/ASSERT or other functionality
- * that relies on exceptions as those are not expected to run in GIF==0
- * context.
- */
-void amd_set_legacy_ssbd(bool enable)
-{
- const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = ¤t_cpu_data;
- struct ssbd_ls_cfg *status;
-
- if ((c->x86 != 0x17 && c->x86 != 0x18) || c->x86_num_siblings <= 1) {
- set_legacy_ssbd(c, enable);
- return;
- }
-
- status = &ssbd_ls_cfg[c->phys_proc_id * ssbd_max_cores +
- c->cpu_core_id];
-
- /*
- * Open code a very simple spinlock: this function is used with GIF==0
- * and different IF values, so would trigger the checklock detector.
- * Instead of trying to workaround the detector, use a very simple lock
- * implementation: it's better to reduce the amount of code executed
- * with GIF==0.
- */
- while (test_and_set_bool(status->locked))
- cpu_relax();
- status->count += enable ? 1 : -1;
- if (enable ? status->count == 1 : !status->count)
- set_legacy_ssbd(c, enable);
- barrier();
- write_atomic(&status->locked, false);
}
/*
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 1aeaabcb13..53ce2edd35 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3126,8 +3126,6 @@ void vmexit_virt_spec_ctrl(void)
if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0);
- else
- amd_set_legacy_ssbd(val);
}
/* Called with GIF=0. */
@@ -3140,8 +3138,6 @@ void vmentry_virt_spec_ctrl(void)
if ( cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
wrmsr(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, val, 0);
- else
- amd_set_legacy_ssbd(val);
}
/*
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h
index 6a42f68542..a82382e6bf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/amd.h
@@ -151,8 +151,4 @@ void check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi(void);
extern bool amd_acpi_c1e_quirk;
void amd_check_disable_c1e(unsigned int port, u8 value);
-extern bool amd_legacy_ssbd;
-bool amd_setup_legacy_ssbd(void);
-void amd_set_legacy_ssbd(bool enable);
-
#endif /* __AMD_H__ */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 4e53056624..ec44205309 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
#include <xen/param.h>
#include <xen/warning.h>
-#include <asm/amd.h>
#include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -1245,8 +1244,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
}
/* Support VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD if AMD_SSBD is not available. */
- if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd &&
- (cpu_has_virt_ssbd || (amd_legacy_ssbd && amd_setup_legacy_ssbd())) )
+ if ( opt_msr_sc_hvm && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SC_MSR_HVM);
/* Figure out default_xen_spec_ctrl. */
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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