[xen stable-4.16] x86/svm: Fix asymmetry with AMD DR MASK context switching

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 3c22a9bf8703a297431ac5ad110e6d523758eae1
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Sep 26 20:06:57 2023 +0100
Commit:     Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Sep 29 15:55:58 2023 +0200

    x86/svm: Fix asymmetry with AMD DR MASK context switching
    
    The handling of MSR_DR{0..3}_MASK is asymmetric between PV and HVM guests.
    
    HVM guests context switch in based on the guest view of DBEXT, whereas PV
    guest switch in base on the host capability.  Both guest types leave the
    context dirty for the next vCPU.
    
    This leads to the following issue:
    
     * PV or HVM vCPU has debugging active (%dr7 + mask)
     * Switch out deactivates %dr7 but leaves other state stale in hardware
     * HVM vCPU with debugging activate but can't see DBEXT is switched in
     * Switch in loads %dr7 but leaves the mask MSRs alone
    
    Now, the HVM vCPU is operating in the context of the prior vCPU's mask MSR,
    and furthermore in a case where it genuinely expects there to be no masking
    MSRs.
    
    As a stopgap, adjust the HVM path to switch in/out the masks based on host
    capabilities rather than guest visibility (i.e. like the PV path).  
Adjustment
    of the of the intercepts still needs to be dependent on the guest visibility
    of DBEXT.
    
    This is part of XSA-444 / CVE-2023-34327
    
    Fixes: c097f54912d3 ("x86/SVM: support data breakpoint extension registers")
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 5d54282f984bb9a7a65b3d12208584f9fdf1c8e1)
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c       |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index a019d196e0..ba4069f910 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
     v->arch.hvm.flag_dr_dirty = 0;
     vmcb_set_dr_intercepts(vmcb, ~0u);
 
+    /*
+     * The guest can only have changed the mask MSRs if we previous dropped
+     * intercepts.  Re-read them from hardware.
+     */
     if ( v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.dbext )
     {
         svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
@@ -216,17 +220,25 @@ static void __restore_debug_registers(struct vmcb_struct 
*vmcb, struct vcpu *v)
 
     ASSERT(v == current);
 
-    if ( v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.dbext )
+    /*
+     * Both the PV and HVM paths leave stale DR_MASK values in hardware on
+     * context-switch-out.  If we're activating %dr7 for the guest, we must
+     * sync the DR_MASKs too, whether or not the guest can see them.
+     */
+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
     {
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[0]);
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[1]);
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[2]);
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[3]);
+
+        if ( v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.dbext )
+        {
+            svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, 
MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+            svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, 
MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+            svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, 
MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+            svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, 
MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+        }
     }
 
     write_debugreg(0, v->arch.dr[0]);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index f7992ff230..a142a63dd8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2314,6 +2314,11 @@ void activate_debugregs(const struct vcpu *curr)
     if ( curr->arch.dr7 & DR7_ACTIVE_MASK )
         write_debugreg(7, curr->arch.dr7);
 
+    /*
+     * Both the PV and HVM paths leave stale DR_MASK values in hardware on
+     * context-switch-out.  If we're activating %dr7 for the guest, we must
+     * sync the DR_MASKs too, whether or not the guest can see them.
+     */
     if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DBEXT) )
     {
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, curr->arch.msrs->dr_mask[0]);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.16