[xen staging-4.14] x86/cpu-policy: Advertise MSR_ARCH_CAPS to guests by default

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 49fbb552c4f5c6663dc83ea923cabe8056ae4710
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed May 17 10:13:36 2023 +0100
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Aug 3 19:14:19 2023 +0100

    x86/cpu-policy: Advertise MSR_ARCH_CAPS to guests by default
    
    With xl/libxl now able to control the policy bits for MSR_ARCH_CAPS, it is
    safe to advertise to guests by default.  In turn, we don't need the special
    case to expose details to dom0.
    
    This advertises MSR_ARCH_CAPS to guests on *all* Intel hardware, even if the
    register content ends up being empty.
    
      - Advertising ARCH_CAPS and not RSBA signals "retpoline is safe here and
        everywhere you might migrate to".  This is important because it avoids 
the
        guest kernel needing to rely on model checks.
    
      - Alternatively, levelling for safety across the Broadwell/Skylake divide
        requires advertising ARCH_CAPS and RSBA, meaning "retpoline not safe on
        some hardware you might migrate to".
    
    On Cascade Lake and later hardware, guests can now see RDCL_NO (not 
vulnerable
    to Meltdown) amongst others.  This causes substantial performance
    improvements, as guests are no longer applying software mitigations in cases
    where they don't need to.
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    (cherry picked from commit 4b2cdbfe766e5666e6754198946df2dc16f6a642)
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c                   | 11 -----------
 xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c
index 9d70e41306..99914b0bff 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu-policy.c
@@ -853,17 +853,6 @@ void __init init_dom0_cpuid_policy(struct domain *d)
     if ( cpu_has_itsc )
         p->extd.itsc = true;
 
-    /*
-     * Expose the "hardware speculation behaviour" bits of ARCH_CAPS to dom0,
-     * so dom0 can turn off workarounds as appropriate.  Temporary, until the
-     * domain policy logic gains a better understanding of MSRs.
-     */
-    if ( is_hardware_domain(d) && cpu_has_arch_caps )
-    {
-        p->feat.arch_caps = true;
-        p->arch_caps.raw = host_cpu_policy.arch_caps.raw;
-    }
-
     /* Apply dom0-cpuid= command line settings, if provided. */
     if ( dom0_cpuid_cmdline )
     {
diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h 
b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
index 357a86521e..be85e7b38a 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CET_IBT,       9*32+20) /*   CET - Indirect 
Branch Tracking */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBRSB,         9*32+26) /*A  IBRS and IBPB support (used by 
Intel) */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(STIBP,         9*32+27) /*A  STIBP */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(L1D_FLUSH,     9*32+28) /*S  MSR_FLUSH_CMD and L1D flush. */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS,     9*32+29) /*!a IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(ARCH_CAPS,     9*32+29) /*!A IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(CORE_CAPS,     9*32+30) /*   IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES MSR */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSBD,          9*32+31) /*A  MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
 
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.14