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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.16] x86/spinlock: introduce support for blocking speculation into critical regions
commit 9104de10b2d1f8864b9092ae427023a421696fef
Author: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Feb 13 13:08:05 2024 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Mar 12 16:26:37 2024 +0000
x86/spinlock: introduce support for blocking speculation into critical
regions
Introduce a new Kconfig option to block speculation into lock protected
critical regions. The Kconfig option is enabled by default, but the
mitigation
won't be engaged unless it's explicitly enabled in the command line using
`spec-ctrl=lock-harden`.
Convert the spinlock acquire macros into always-inline functions, and
introduce
a speculation barrier after the lock has been taken. Note the speculation
barrier is not placed inside the implementation of the spin lock functions,
as
to prevent speculation from falling through the call to the lock functions
resulting in the barrier also being skipped.
trylock variants are protected using a construct akin to the existing
evaluate_nospec().
This patch only implements the speculation barrier for x86.
Note spin locks are the only locking primitive taken care in this change,
further locking primitives will be adjusted by separate changes.
This is part of XSA-453 / CVE-2024-2193
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit 7ef0084418e188d05f338c3e028fbbe8b6924afa)
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 7 ++++++-
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
xen/common/Kconfig | 17 +++++++++++++++++
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/nospec.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
xen/include/xen/spinlock.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
7 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index 029002fa82..33c32cfc1c 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -2263,7 +2263,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e
`ssbd=runtime`).
> {msr-sc,rsb,verw,ibpb-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
> eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
-> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub}=<bool> ]`
+> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden}=<bool> ]`
Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen
will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support,
@@ -2388,6 +2388,11 @@ On all hardware, the `div-scrub=` option can be used to
force or prevent Xen
from mitigating the DIV-leakage vulnerability. By default, Xen will mitigate
DIV-leakage on hardware believed to be vulnerable.
+If Xen is compiled with `CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK`, the `lock-harden=`
+boolean can be used to force or prevent Xen from using speculation barriers to
+protect lock critical regions. This mitigation won't be engaged by default,
+and needs to be explicitly enabled on the command line.
+
### sync_console
> `= <boolean>`
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 24bf98a018..0a7af22a9b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = -1;
int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1;
int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1;
static bool __initdata opt_branch_harden = true;
+static bool __initdata opt_lock_harden;
bool __initdata bsp_delay_spec_ctrl;
uint8_t __read_mostly default_xen_spec_ctrl;
@@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
opt_ssbd = false;
opt_l1d_flush = 0;
opt_branch_harden = false;
+ opt_lock_harden = false;
opt_srb_lock = 0;
opt_unpriv_mmio = false;
opt_gds_mit = 0;
@@ -282,6 +284,16 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
opt_l1d_flush = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("branch-harden", s, ss)) >= 0 )
opt_branch_harden = val;
+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("lock-harden", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+ {
+ if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK) )
+ opt_lock_harden = val;
+ else
+ {
+ no_config_param("SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK", "spec-ctrl", s, ss);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("srb-lock", s, ss)) >= 0 )
opt_srb_lock = val;
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("unpriv-mmio", s, ss)) >= 0 )
@@ -481,18 +493,22 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
(e21a & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SBPB)) ? " SBPB"
: "");
/* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
- if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
)
+ if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING)
||
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK) )
printk(" Compiled-in support:"
#ifdef CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK
" INDIRECT_THUNK"
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING
" SHADOW_PAGING"
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK
+ " HARDEN_LOCK"
#endif
"\n");
/* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
- printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s,
Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s,
Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" :
thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" :
@@ -518,7 +534,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
opt_verw_pv || opt_verw_hvm ||
opt_verw_mmio ? " VERW" : "",
opt_div_scrub ? " DIV" : "",
- opt_branch_harden ? " BRANCH_HARDEN" : "");
+ opt_branch_harden ? " BRANCH_HARDEN" : "",
+ opt_lock_harden ? " LOCK_HARDEN" : "");
/* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. */
if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf || opt_pv_l1tf_hwdom || opt_pv_l1tf_domu )
@@ -1889,6 +1906,9 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
if ( !opt_branch_harden )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_NO_BRANCH_HARDEN);
+ if ( !opt_lock_harden )
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_NO_LOCK_HARDEN);
+
/*
* We do not disable HT by default on affected hardware.
*
diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig
index c9f4b7f492..01c70109f5 100644
--- a/xen/common/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/common/Kconfig
@@ -161,6 +161,23 @@ config SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_GUEST_ACCESS
If unsure, say Y.
+config SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK
+ bool "Speculative lock context hardening"
+ default y
+ depends on X86
+ help
+ Contemporary processors may use speculative execution as a
+ performance optimisation, but this can potentially be abused by an
+ attacker to leak data via speculative sidechannels.
+
+ One source of data leakage is via speculative accesses to lock
+ critical regions.
+
+ This option is disabled by default at run time, and needs to be
+ enabled on the command line.
+
+ If unsure, say Y.
+
endmenu
config HYPFS
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
index 70b93b6b44..7e8221fd85 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(APERFMPERF, X86_SYNTH( 8)) /*
APERFMPERF */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(MFENCE_RDTSC, X86_SYNTH( 9)) /* MFENCE synchronizes RDTSC
*/
XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMEP, X86_SYNTH(10)) /* SMEP gets used by Xen
itself */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SMAP, X86_SYNTH(11)) /* SMAP gets used by Xen
itself */
-/* Bit 12 - unused. */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_NO_LOCK_HARDEN, X86_SYNTH(12)) /* (Disable) Lock critical
region hardening */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_LFENCE, X86_SYNTH(13)) /* Use IND_THUNK_LFENCE */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(IND_THUNK_JMP, X86_SYNTH(14)) /* Use IND_THUNK_JMP */
XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_NO_BRANCH_HARDEN, X86_SYNTH(15)) /* (Disable) Conditional
branch hardening */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h
index 7150e76b87..0725839e19 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/nospec.h
@@ -38,6 +38,32 @@ static always_inline void block_speculation(void)
barrier_nospec_true();
}
+static always_inline void arch_block_lock_speculation(void)
+{
+ alternative("lfence", "", X86_FEATURE_SC_NO_LOCK_HARDEN);
+}
+
+/* Allow to insert a read memory barrier into conditionals */
+static always_inline bool barrier_lock_true(void)
+{
+ alternative("lfence #nospec-true", "", X86_FEATURE_SC_NO_LOCK_HARDEN);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static always_inline bool barrier_lock_false(void)
+{
+ alternative("lfence #nospec-false", "", X86_FEATURE_SC_NO_LOCK_HARDEN);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static always_inline bool arch_lock_evaluate_nospec(bool condition)
+{
+ if ( condition )
+ return barrier_lock_true();
+ else
+ return barrier_lock_false();
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_H */
/*
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/nospec.h b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h
index 76255bc46e..4552846403 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/nospec.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/nospec.h
@@ -70,6 +70,21 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned
long index,
#define array_access_nospec(array, index) \
(array)[array_index_nospec(index, ARRAY_SIZE(array))]
+static always_inline void block_lock_speculation(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK
+ arch_block_lock_speculation();
+#endif
+}
+
+static always_inline bool lock_evaluate_nospec(bool condition)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_LOCK
+ return arch_lock_evaluate_nospec(condition);
+#endif
+ return condition;
+}
+
#endif /* XEN_NOSPEC_H */
/*
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h b/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h
index 9fa4e600c1..efdb21ea90 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/spinlock.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#ifndef __SPINLOCK_H__
#define __SPINLOCK_H__
+#include <xen/nospec.h>
#include <xen/time.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
#include <asm/spinlock.h>
@@ -189,13 +190,30 @@ int _spin_trylock_recursive(spinlock_t *lock);
void _spin_lock_recursive(spinlock_t *lock);
void _spin_unlock_recursive(spinlock_t *lock);
-#define spin_lock(l) _spin_lock(l)
-#define spin_lock_cb(l, c, d) _spin_lock_cb(l, c, d)
-#define spin_lock_irq(l) _spin_lock_irq(l)
+static always_inline void spin_lock(spinlock_t *l)
+{
+ _spin_lock(l);
+ block_lock_speculation();
+}
+
+static always_inline void spin_lock_cb(spinlock_t *l, void (*c)(void *data),
+ void *d)
+{
+ _spin_lock_cb(l, c, d);
+ block_lock_speculation();
+}
+
+static always_inline void spin_lock_irq(spinlock_t *l)
+{
+ _spin_lock_irq(l);
+ block_lock_speculation();
+}
+
#define spin_lock_irqsave(l, f) \
({ \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(f) != sizeof(unsigned long)); \
((f) = _spin_lock_irqsave(l)); \
+ block_lock_speculation(); \
})
#define spin_unlock(l) _spin_unlock(l)
@@ -203,7 +221,7 @@ void _spin_unlock_recursive(spinlock_t *lock);
#define spin_unlock_irqrestore(l, f) _spin_unlock_irqrestore(l, f)
#define spin_is_locked(l) _spin_is_locked(l)
-#define spin_trylock(l) _spin_trylock(l)
+#define spin_trylock(l) lock_evaluate_nospec(_spin_trylock(l))
#define spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags) \
({ \
@@ -224,8 +242,15 @@ void _spin_unlock_recursive(spinlock_t *lock);
* are any critical regions that cannot form part of such a set, they can use
* standard spin_[un]lock().
*/
-#define spin_trylock_recursive(l) _spin_trylock_recursive(l)
-#define spin_lock_recursive(l) _spin_lock_recursive(l)
+#define spin_trylock_recursive(l) \
+ lock_evaluate_nospec(_spin_trylock_recursive(l))
+
+static always_inline void spin_lock_recursive(spinlock_t *l)
+{
+ _spin_lock_recursive(l);
+ block_lock_speculation();
+}
+
#define spin_unlock_recursive(l) _spin_unlock_recursive(l)
#endif /* __SPINLOCK_H__ */
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.16
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