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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.17] x86/spec-ctrl: VERW-handling adjustments
commit 6663430b442fdf9698bd8e03f701a4547309ad71
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Mar 5 19:33:37 2024 +0000
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Mar 12 16:13:03 2024 +0000
x86/spec-ctrl: VERW-handling adjustments
... before we add yet more complexity to this logic. Mostly expanded
comments, but with three minor changes.
1) Introduce cpu_has_useful_md_clear to simplify later logic in this patch
and
future ones.
2) We only ever need SC_VERW_IDLE when SMT is active. If SMT isn't active,
then there's no re-partition of pipeline resources based on
thread-idleness
to worry about.
3) The logic to adjust HVM VERW based on L1D_FLUSH is unmaintainable and, as
it turns out, wrong. SKIP_L1DFL is just a hint bit, whereas
opt_l1d_flush
is the relevant decision of whether to use L1D_FLUSH based on
susceptibility and user preference.
Rewrite the logic so it can be followed, and incorporate the fact that
when
FB_CLEAR is visible, L1D_FLUSH isn't a safe substitution.
This is part of XSA-452 / CVE-2023-28746.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit 1eb91a8a06230b4b64228c9a380194f8cfe6c5e2)
---
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index e12ec9930c..adb6bc74e8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -1531,7 +1531,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
{
enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
bool has_spec_ctrl, ibrs = false, hw_smt_enabled;
- bool cpu_has_bug_taa, retpoline_safe;
+ bool cpu_has_bug_taa, cpu_has_useful_md_clear, retpoline_safe;
hw_smt_enabled = check_smt_enabled();
@@ -1867,50 +1867,97 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
"enabled. Please assess your configuration and choose an\n"
"explicit 'smt=<bool>' setting. See XSA-273.\n");
+ /*
+ * A brief summary of VERW-related changes.
+ *
+ *
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling.html
+ *
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/processor-mmio-stale-data-vulnerabilities.html
+ *
+ * Relevant ucodes:
+ *
+ * - May 2019, for MDS. Introduces the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit and VERW side
+ * effects to scrub Store/Load/Fill buffers as applicable. MD_CLEAR
+ * exists architecturally, even when the side effects have been removed.
+ *
+ * Use VERW to scrub on return-to-guest. Parts with L1D_FLUSH to
+ * mitigate L1TF have the same side effect, so no need to do both.
+ *
+ * Various Atoms suffer from Store-buffer sampling only. Store buffers
+ * are statically partitioned between non-idle threads, so scrubbing is
+ * wanted when going idle too.
+ *
+ * Load ports and Fill buffers are competitively shared between threads.
+ * SMT must be disabled for VERW scrubbing to be fully effective.
+ *
+ * - November 2019, for TAA. Extended VERW side effects to TSX-enabled
+ * MDS_NO parts.
+ *
+ * - February 2022, for Client TSX de-feature. Removed VERW side effects
+ * from Client CPUs only.
+ *
+ * - May 2022, for MMIO Stale Data. (Re)introduced Fill Buffer scrubbing
+ * on all MMIO-affected parts which didn't already have it for MDS
+ * reasons, enumerating FB_CLEAR on those parts only.
+ *
+ * If FB_CLEAR is enumerated, L1D_FLUSH does not have the same scrubbing
+ * side effects as VERW and cannot be used in its place.
+ */
mds_calculations();
/*
- * Parts which enumerate FB_CLEAR are those which are post-MDS_NO and have
- * reintroduced the VERW fill buffer flushing side effect because of a
- * susceptibility to FBSDP.
+ * Parts which enumerate FB_CLEAR are those with now-updated microcode
+ * which weren't susceptible to the original MFBDS (and therefore didn't
+ * have Fill Buffer scrubbing side effects to begin with, or were Client
+ * MDS_NO non-TAA_NO parts where the scrubbing was removed), but have had
+ * the scrubbing reintroduced because of a susceptibility to FBSDP.
*
* If unprivileged guests have (or will have) MMIO mappings, we can
* mitigate cross-domain leakage of fill buffer data by issuing VERW on
- * the return-to-guest path.
+ * the return-to-guest path. This is only a token effort if SMT is
+ * active.
*/
if ( opt_unpriv_mmio )
opt_verw_mmio = cpu_has_fb_clear;
/*
- * By default, enable PV and HVM mitigations on MDS-vulnerable hardware.
- * This will only be a token effort for MLPDS/MFBDS when HT is enabled,
- * but it is somewhat better than nothing.
+ * MD_CLEAR is enumerated architecturally forevermore, even after the
+ * scrubbing side effects have been removed. Create ourselves an version
+ * which expressed whether we think MD_CLEAR is having any useful side
+ * effect.
+ */
+ cpu_has_useful_md_clear = (cpu_has_md_clear &&
+ (cpu_has_bug_mds || cpu_has_bug_msbds_only));
+
+ /*
+ * By default, use VERW scrubbing on applicable hardware, if we think it's
+ * going to have an effect. This will only be a token effort for
+ * MLPDS/MFBDS when SMT is enabled.
*/
if ( opt_verw_pv == -1 )
- opt_verw_pv = ((cpu_has_bug_mds || cpu_has_bug_msbds_only) &&
- cpu_has_md_clear);
+ opt_verw_pv = cpu_has_useful_md_clear;
if ( opt_verw_hvm == -1 )
- opt_verw_hvm = ((cpu_has_bug_mds || cpu_has_bug_msbds_only) &&
- cpu_has_md_clear);
+ opt_verw_hvm = cpu_has_useful_md_clear;
/*
- * Enable MDS/MMIO defences as applicable. The Idle blocks need using if
- * either the PV or HVM MDS defences are used, or if we may give MMIO
- * access to untrusted guests.
- *
- * HVM is more complicated. The MD_CLEAR microcode extends L1D_FLUSH with
- * equivalent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the
- * HVM path. Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH (for
- * MDS mitigations. L1D_FLUSH is not safe for MMIO mitigations.)
- *
- * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify
- * opt_verw_hvm to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM
- * guests", so spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings.
+ * If SMT is active, and we're protecting against MDS or MMIO stale data,
+ * we need to scrub before going idle as well as on return to guest.
+ * Various pipeline resources are repartitioned amongst non-idle threads.
*/
- if ( opt_verw_pv || opt_verw_hvm || opt_verw_mmio )
+ if ( ((cpu_has_useful_md_clear && (opt_verw_pv || opt_verw_hvm)) ||
+ opt_verw_mmio) && hw_smt_enabled )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE);
- opt_verw_hvm &= !cpu_has_skip_l1dfl && !opt_l1d_flush;
+
+ /*
+ * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify opt_verw_hvm
+ * to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM guests", so
+ * spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings.
+ *
+ * It is only safe to use L1D_FLUSH in place of VERW when MD_CLEAR is the
+ * only *_CLEAR we can see.
+ */
+ if ( opt_l1d_flush && cpu_has_md_clear && !cpu_has_fb_clear )
+ opt_verw_hvm = false;
/*
* Warn the user if they are on MLPDS/MFBDS-vulnerable hardware with HT
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.17
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