[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging-4.18] x86/tsx: Cope with RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch
commit 855e261337aab70c904ab5908b67daf8ad80b1a0 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Wed Apr 3 17:43:42 2024 +0100 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Apr 9 16:45:01 2024 +0100 x86/tsx: Cope with RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch It turns out there is something wonky on some but not all CPUs with MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT. The presence of RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT causes Xen to think it's safe to offer HLE/RTM to guests, but in this case, XBEGIN instructions genuinely #UD. Spot this case and try to back out as cleanly as we can. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit b33f191e3ca99458fdcea1cb5a29dfa4965d1604) --- xen/arch/x86/tsx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c index 50d8059f23..fbdd05971c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/tsx.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ #include <xen/init.h> #include <xen/param.h> +#include <asm/microcode.h> #include <asm/msr.h> /* @@ -9,6 +10,7 @@ * -1 => Default, altered to 0/1 (if unspecified) by: * - TAA heuristics/settings for speculative safety * - "TSX vs PCR3" select for TSX memory ordering safety + * -2 => Implicit tsx=0 (from RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch) * -3 => Implicit tsx=1 (feed-through from spec-ctrl=0) * * This is arranged such that the bottom bit encodes whether TSX is actually @@ -114,11 +116,50 @@ void tsx_init(void) if ( cpu_has_tsx_force_abort ) { + uint64_t val; + /* - * On an early TSX-enable Skylake part subject to the memory + * On an early TSX-enabled Skylake part subject to the memory * ordering erratum, with at least the March 2019 microcode. */ + rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, val); + + /* + * At the time of writing (April 2024), it was discovered that + * some parts (e.g. CoffeeLake 8th Gen, 06-9e-0a, ucode 0xf6) + * advertise RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT, but XBEGIN instructions #UD. Other + * similar parts (e.g. KabyLake Xeon-E3, 06-9e-09, ucode 0xf8) + * operate as expected. + * + * In this case: + * - RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT and MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT are enumerated. + * - XBEGIN instructions genuinely #UD. + * - MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT appears to be write-discard and fails to + * hold its value. + * - HLE and RTM are not enumerated, despite + * MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT.TSX_CPUID_CLEAR being clear. + * + * Spot RTM being unavailable without CLEAR_CPUID being set, and + * treat it as if no TSX is available at all. This will prevent + * Xen from thinking it's safe to offer HLE/RTM to VMs. + */ + if ( val == 0 && cpu_has_rtm_always_abort && !cpu_has_rtm ) + { + printk(XENLOG_ERR + "FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT vs RTM mismatch\n", + boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model, + boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev); + + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT); + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT); + + if ( opt_tsx < 0 ) + opt_tsx = -2; + + goto done_probe; + } + /* * Probe for the June 2021 microcode which de-features TSX on * client parts. (Note - this is a subset of parts impacted by @@ -128,15 +169,8 @@ void tsx_init(void) * read as zero if TSX_FORCE_ABORT.ENABLE_RTM has been set before * we run. */ - if ( !has_rtm_always_abort ) - { - uint64_t val; - - rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, val); - - if ( val & TSX_ENABLE_RTM ) - has_rtm_always_abort = true; - } + if ( val & TSX_ENABLE_RTM ) + has_rtm_always_abort = true; /* * If no explicit tsx= option is provided, pick a default. @@ -191,6 +225,7 @@ void tsx_init(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM); } } + done_probe: /* * Note: MSR_TSX_CTRL is enumerated on TSX-enabled MDS_NO and later parts. -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.18
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