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[xen staging-4.17] x86/spec-ctrl: Rework conditional safety for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_*

Date: Tue, 09 Apr 2024 17:23:52 +0000

Delivery-date: Tue, 09 Apr 2024 17:23:53 +0000

List-id: "Change log for Mercurial $receive only$" <xen-changelog.lists.xenproject.org>

commit 05f6fe7c39fe0c44807a51f6aa1d8ee1a38de197 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Mar 22 11:41:41 2024 +0000 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Tue Apr 9 16:48:19 2024 +0100 x86/spec-ctrl: Rework conditional safety for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_* Right now, we have a mix of safety strategies in different blocks, making the logic fragile and hard to follow. Start addressing this by having a safety LFENCE at the end of the blocks, which can be patched out if other safety criteria are met. This will allow us to simplify the sub-blocks. For SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_IST, simply leave an LFENCE unconditionally at the end; the IST path is not a fast-path by any stretch of the imagination. For SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR, the existing description was incorrect. The IRET #GP path is non-fatal but can occur with the guest's choice of MSR_SPEC_CTRL. It is safe to skip the flush/barrier-like protections when interrupting Xen, but we must run DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY irrespective. This will skip RSB stuffing which was previously unconditional even when interrupting Xen. AFAICT, this is a missing cleanup from commit 3fffaf9c13e9 ("x86/entry: Avoid using alternatives in NMI/#MC paths") where we split the IST entry path out of the main INTR entry path. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Roger Pau MonnÃ© <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> (cherry picked from commit 94896de1a98c4289fe6fef9e16ef99fc6ef2efc4) --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S | 1 + xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 4 +++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 27 +++++++++-------- xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S index 4ee529c57a..8d5b683879 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler) wrmsr .endm ALTERNATIVE "", restore_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM + ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ /* Hardware clears MSR_DEBUGCTL on VMExit. Reinstate it if debugging Xen. */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 7e8221fd85..6422c66b0f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -52,5 +52,9 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM, X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for #define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE X86_BUG( 2) /* MFENCE needed to serialise CLFLUSH */ #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG( 3) /* IBPB doesn't flush the RSB/RAS */ +#define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV X86_BUG(16) /* (No) safety LFENCE for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_PV. */ +#define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR X86_BUG(17) /* (No) safety LFENCE for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_INTR. */ +#define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX X86_BUG(18) /* (No) safety LFENCE for SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_VMX. */ + /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */ #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h index 8c488be048..e58e5110d9 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h @@ -273,25 +273,37 @@ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0), \ X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV + + ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV .endm /* * Used after an exception or maskable interrupt, hitting Xen or PV context. - * There will either be a guest speculation context, or (barring fatal - * exceptions) a well-formed Xen speculation context. + * There will either be a guest speculation context, or a well-formed Xen + * speculation context, with the exception of one case. IRET #GP handling may + * have a guest choice of MSR_SPEC_CTRL. + * + * Therefore, we can skip the flush/barrier-like protections when hitting Xen, + * but we must still run the mode-based protections. */ .macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end, %rdx=0 * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx */ + testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) + jz .L\@_skip + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=1), \ X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV +.L\@_skip: ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1), \ X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV + + ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR .endm /* @@ -360,18 +372,9 @@ movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_spec_ctrl)(%r14), %eax wrmsr - /* Opencoded UNLIKELY_START() with no condition. */ -UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise): - .subsection 1 - /* - * In the case that we might need to set SPEC_CTRL.IBRS for safety, we - * need to ensure that an attacker can't poison the `jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr` - * to speculate around the WRMSR. As a result, we need a dispatch - * serialising instruction in the else clause. - */ .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl: + lfence - UNLIKELY_END(\@_serialise) .endm /* diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c index ab81ad457b..2b22deb891 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c @@ -2154,6 +2154,58 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) print_details(thunk); + /* + * With the alternative blocks now chosen, see if we need any other + * adjustments for safety. + * + * We compile the LFENCE in, and patch it out if it's not needed. + * + * Notes: + * - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_SVM doesn't need an LFENCE because it has an + * unconditional STGI. + * - SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_IST handles its own safety, without the use of + * alternatives. + * - DO_OVERWRITE_RSB has conditional branches in it, but it's an inline + * sequence. It is considered safe for uarch reasons. + */ + { + /* + * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV conditional safety + * + * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an + * unconditional WRMSR as the last action. + * + * If we have it, or we're not using any prior conditional mitigation, + * then it's safe to drop the LFENCE. + */ + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV); + + /* + * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR conditional safety + * + * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an + * unconditional WRMSR as the last action. + * + * If we have it, or we have no protections active in the block that + * is skipped when interrupting guest context, then it's safe to drop + * the LFENCE. + */ + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) || + (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV)) ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR); + + /* + * SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMX conditional safety + * + * Currently there are no safety actions with conditional branches, so + * no need for the extra safety LFENCE. + */ + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX); + } + /* * If MSR_SPEC_CTRL is available, apply Xen's default setting and discard * any firmware settings. For performance reasons, when safe to do so, we -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.17

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