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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.17] x86/spec-ctrl: Wire up the Native-BHI software sequences
commit eab897caca018c126f925247e4c9fd4aac54afdb
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Jun 8 19:41:44 2023 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Apr 9 16:48:19 2024 +0100
x86/spec-ctrl: Wire up the Native-BHI software sequences
In the absence of BHI_DIS_S, mitigating Native-BHI requires the use of a
software sequence.
Introduce a new bhb-seq= option to select between avaialble sequences and
bhb-entry= to control the per-PV/HVM actions like we have for other blocks.
Activate the short sequence by default for PV and HVM guests on affected
hardware if BHI_DIS_S isn't present.
This is part of XSA-456 / CVE-2024-2201.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit 689ad48ce9cf4c38297cd126e7e003a1c13a3b9d)
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 25 +++++--
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index 0b0abf8983..0bd0588097 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -2324,8 +2324,9 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e
`ssbd=runtime`).
### spec-ctrl (x86)
> `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm}=<bool>,
-> {msr-sc,rsb,verw,ibpb-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
-> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
+> {msr-sc,rsb,verw,{ibpb,bhb}-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>,
+> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp,bhb-seq=short|tsx,
+> {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd,
> eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,
> unpriv-mmio,gds-mit,div-scrub,lock-harden,
> bhi-dis-s}=<bool> ]`
@@ -2350,10 +2351,10 @@ in place for guests to use.
Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid.
-The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=`, `verw=` and `ibpb-entry=` options
-offer fine grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's
-ability to protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for
-guests to use.
+The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=`, `verw=`, `ibpb-entry=` and `bhb-entry=`
+options offer fine grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact
+Xen's ability to protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support
+for guests to use.
* `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests
respectively.
@@ -2379,6 +2380,12 @@ guests to use.
Return Stack Overflow if appropriate microcode has been loaded, but for
performance reasons dom0 is unprotected by default. If it is necessary to
protect dom0 too, boot with `spec-ctrl=ibpb-entry`.
+* `bhb-entry=` offers control over whether BHB-clearing (Branch History
+ Buffer) sequences are used on entry to Xen. This is used by default on
+ hardware vulnerable to Branch History Injection, when the BHI_DIS_S control
+ is not available (see `bhi-dis-s`). The choice of scrubbing sequence can be
+ selected using the `bhb-seq=` option. If it is necessary to protect dom0
+ too, boot with `spec-ctrl=bhb-entry`.
If Xen was compiled with `CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK` support, `bti-thunk=` can be
used to select which of the thunks gets patched into the
@@ -2386,6 +2393,12 @@ used to select which of the thunks gets patched into the
(generally preferred), with the alternatives being `jmp` (a `jmp *%reg` gadget,
minimal overhead), and `lfence` (an `lfence; jmp *%reg` gadget).
+On all hardware, `bhb-seq=` can be used to select which of the BHB-clearing
+sequences gets used. This interacts with the `bhb-entry=` and `bhi-dis-s=`
+options in order to mitigate Branch History Injection on affected hardware.
+The default sequence is `short`, with `tsx` as an alternative available
+capable hardware that can be opted in to.
+
On hardware supporting IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation), the
`ibrs=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself.
If Xen is not using IBRS itself, functionality is still set up so IBRS can be
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 546199fabe..b53e9c4e7a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@ static int8_t __ro_after_init opt_ibpb_entry_pv = -1;
static int8_t __ro_after_init opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = -1;
static bool __ro_after_init opt_ibpb_entry_dom0;
+static int8_t __ro_after_init opt_bhb_entry_pv = -1;
+static int8_t __ro_after_init opt_bhb_entry_hvm = -1;
+static bool __ro_after_init opt_bhb_entry_dom0;
+static enum bhb_thunk {
+ BHB_DEFAULT,
+ BHB_NONE,
+ BHB_TSX,
+ BHB_SHORT,
+} opt_bhb_seq __initdata;
+
/* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */
static enum ind_thunk {
THUNK_DEFAULT, /* Decide which thunk to use at boot time. */
@@ -128,8 +138,12 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
opt_ibpb_entry_pv = 0;
opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = 0;
opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = false;
+ opt_bhb_entry_pv = 0;
+ opt_bhb_entry_hvm = 0;
+ opt_bhb_entry_dom0 = false;
opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP;
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_NONE;
opt_ibrs = 0;
opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false;
opt_ssbd = false;
@@ -158,6 +172,7 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
opt_rsb_pv = val;
opt_verw_pv = val;
opt_ibpb_entry_pv = val;
+ opt_bhb_entry_pv = val;
}
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
{
@@ -165,6 +180,7 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
opt_rsb_hvm = val;
opt_verw_hvm = val;
opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = val;
+ opt_bhb_entry_hvm = val;
}
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) != -1 )
{
@@ -252,6 +268,28 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
break;
}
}
+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("bhb-entry", s, ss)) != -1 )
+ {
+ switch ( val )
+ {
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ opt_bhb_entry_pv = opt_bhb_entry_hvm =
+ opt_bhb_entry_dom0 = val;
+ break;
+
+ case -2:
+ s += strlen("bhb-entry=");
+ if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+ opt_bhb_entry_pv = val;
+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+ opt_bhb_entry_hvm = val;
+ else
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
/* Xen's speculative sidechannel mitigation settings. */
else if ( !strncmp(s, "bti-thunk=", 10) )
@@ -272,6 +310,19 @@ static int __init cf_check parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s)
else
rc = -EINVAL;
}
+ else if ( !strncmp(s, "bhb-seq=", 8) )
+ {
+ s += strlen("bhb-seq=");
+
+ if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "none") )
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_NONE;
+ else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "tsx") )
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_TSX;
+ else if ( !cmdline_strcmp(s, "short") )
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_SHORT;
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
/* Bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */
else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibrs", s, ss)) >= 0 )
@@ -539,12 +590,16 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
"\n");
/* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
- printk(" Xen settings: %s%sSPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s%s,
Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Xen settings: %s%s%s%sSPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s%s,
Other:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
thunk != THUNK_NONE ? "BTI-Thunk: " : "",
thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "" :
thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE, " :
thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE, " :
thunk == THUNK_JMP ? "JMP, " : "?, ",
+ opt_bhb_seq != BHB_NONE ? "BHB-Seq: " : "",
+ opt_bhb_seq == BHB_NONE ? "" :
+ opt_bhb_seq == BHB_TSX ? "TSX, " :
+ opt_bhb_seq == BHB_SHORT ? "SHORT, " : "?, ",
(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) ? "No" :
(default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) ? "IBRS+" : "IBRS-",
@@ -583,11 +638,11 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
* mitigation support for guests.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HVM
- printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ||
- amd_virt_spec_ctrl ||
+ cpu_has_bhb_seq || amd_virt_spec_ctrl ||
opt_eager_fpu || opt_verw_hvm) ? "" : "
None",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ||
@@ -595,20 +650,23 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ? " RSB" : "",
opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "",
opt_verw_hvm ? " VERW" : "",
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ? " IBPB-entry" : "");
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ? " IBPB-entry" : "",
+ cpu_has_bhb_seq ? " BHB-entry" : "");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PV
- printk(" Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ||
+ cpu_has_bhb_seq ||
opt_eager_fpu || opt_verw_pv) ? "" : "
None",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "",
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ? " RSB" : "",
opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "",
opt_verw_pv ? " VERW" : "",
- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ? " IBPB-entry" : "");
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ? " IBPB-entry" : "",
+ cpu_has_bhb_seq ? " BHB-entry" : "");
printk(" XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 %s, DomU %s (with%s PCID)\n",
opt_xpti_hwdom ? "enabled" : "disabled",
@@ -1616,16 +1674,85 @@ static void __init gds_calculations(void)
/*
*
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
*/
+static bool __init cpu_has_bug_bhi(void)
+{
+ /* BHI is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ return false;
+
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_NO) )
+ return false;
+
+ if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
+ return true; /* TODO: how to figure out out if we're really eIBRS
levelled out? */
+
+ return cpu_has_eibrs;
+}
+
static void __init bhi_calculations(void)
{
+ bool has_bhi = cpu_has_bug_bhi();
+
+ /*
+ * To mitigate BHI, we want to use BHI_DIS_S wherever possible, or the
+ * short sequence otherwise. Other forms are available on request.
+ *
+ * We are repsonsbile for performing default-conversion on opt_bhi_dis_s
+ * and opt_bhb_seq, irrespective of succeptibility to BHI.
+ */
+
if ( opt_bhi_dis_s == -1 )
- opt_bhi_dis_s = !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_NO);
+ opt_bhi_dis_s = has_bhi;
if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL) )
opt_bhi_dis_s = false;
if ( opt_bhi_dis_s )
default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S;
+
+ if ( opt_bhb_seq == BHB_DEFAULT )
+ {
+ /*
+ * If we're using BHI_DIS_S, or we're not succeptable, don't activate
+ * the thunks.
+ */
+ if ( !has_bhi || opt_bhi_dis_s )
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_NONE;
+ else
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_SHORT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can use the TSX even if it's disabled for e.g. TAA reasons.
+ * However, fall back to the loop sequence if there is no trace of RTM at
+ * all, as XBEGIN will #UD.
+ */
+ if ( opt_bhb_seq == BHB_TSX && !cpu_has_rtm && !cpu_has_rtm_always_abort &&
+ !cpu_has_tsx_force_abort )
+ opt_bhb_seq = BHB_SHORT;
+
+ /*
+ * Only activate SCF_entry_bhb by for guests if a sequence is in place.
+ */
+ if ( opt_bhb_entry_pv == -1 )
+ opt_bhb_entry_pv = has_bhi && opt_bhb_seq != BHB_NONE;
+ if ( opt_bhb_entry_hvm == -1 )
+ opt_bhb_entry_hvm = has_bhi && opt_bhb_seq != BHB_NONE;
+
+ switch ( opt_bhb_seq )
+ {
+ case BHB_SHORT:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS);
+ break;
+
+ case BHB_TSX:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
}
void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
@@ -1638,9 +1765,13 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d)
bool ibpb = ((pv ? opt_ibpb_entry_pv : opt_ibpb_entry_hvm) &&
(d->domain_id != 0 || opt_ibpb_entry_dom0));
+ bool bhb = ((pv ? opt_bhb_entry_pv : opt_bhb_entry_hvm) &&
+ (d->domain_id != 0 || opt_bhb_entry_dom0));
+
d->arch.scf =
(verw ? SCF_verw : 0) |
(ibpb ? SCF_entry_ibpb : 0) |
+ (bhb ? SCF_entry_bhb : 0) |
0;
}
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.17
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