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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen stable-4.18] x86/spec-ctrl: Software BHB-clearing sequences
commit 72a357f4fa4e26fd7bc7dff0fdf1174caf90624e
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Jun 8 19:41:44 2023 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Apr 9 16:45:01 2024 +0100
x86/spec-ctrl: Software BHB-clearing sequences
Implement clear_bhb_{tsx,loops}() as per the BHI guidance. The loops
variant
is set up as the "short" sequence.
Introduce SCF_entry_bhb and extend SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_* with a conditional call
to selected clearing routine.
Note that due to a limitation in the ALTERNATIVE capability, the TEST/JZ
can't
be included alongside a CALL in a single alternative block. This is going
to
require further work to untangle.
The BHB sequences (if used) must be after the restoration of Xen's
MSR_SPEC_CTRL value, which must be accounted for when judging whether it is
safe to skip the safety LFENCEs.
This is part of XSA-456 / CVE-2024-2201.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
(cherry picked from commit 954c983abceee97bf5f6230b9ae164f2c49a9aa9)
---
xen/arch/x86/Makefile | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S | 12 ++++
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 3 +
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 3 +-
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h | 30 ++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 39 +++++++------
8 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
index 9f326b9e32..85b3f85608 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ alternative-y := alternative.init.o
alternative-$(CONFIG_LIVEPATCH) :=
obj-bin-y += $(alternative-y)
obj-y += apic.o
+obj-y += bhb-thunk.o
obj-y += bitops.o
obj-bin-y += bzimage.init.o
obj-bin-y += clear_page.o
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f52cfb9bc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/bhb-thunk.S
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * Branch History Injection clearing sequences.
+ *
+ *
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023, 2024 XenServer.
+ */
+ .file __FILE__
+
+#include <asm/asm_defns.h>
+
+ .section .text.entry, "ax", @progbits
+
+/*
+ * Clear the Branch History Buffer using a TSX Abort.
+ *
+ * Any TSX Abort has a side effect of clearing the BHB, even when TSX is
+ * disabled for e.g. TAA mitigation reasons.
+ */
+ENTRY(clear_bhb_tsx)
+ .byte 0xc7, 0xf8; .long 1f - 0f /* xbegin 1f */
+0: .byte 0xc6, 0xf8, 0 /* xabort $0 */
+ int3
+1:
+ ret
+
+ .size clear_bhb_tsx, . - clear_bhb_tsx
+ .type clear_bhb_tsx, @function
+
+/*
+ * Clear the Branch History Buffer using the software sequence.
+ *
+ * Clobbers: %eax, %ecx
+ *
+ * This executes a specific number of taken branches, sufficient to displace
+ * all prior entries in the history tracker, therefore removing prior
+ * influence on subsequent BTB lookups.
+ *
+ * Structurally, it looks like this:
+ *
+ * call 1
+ * call 2
+ * ... 5x jmp loop
+ * call 2
+ * ... 5x jmp loop
+ * ... 5x call2's deep
+ *
+ * ret
+ * ret
+ * ret
+ * ret
+ *
+ * The CALL/RETs are necessary to prevent the Loop Stream Detector from
+ * interfering. The alignment is for performance and not safety.
+ *
+ * The "short" sequence (5 and 5) is for CPUs prior to Alder Lake / Sapphire
+ * Rapids (i.e. Cores prior to Golden Cove and/or Gracemont).
+ */
+ENTRY(clear_bhb_loops)
+ mov $5, %ecx
+
+ call 1f
+ jmp 5f
+ int3
+
+ .align 64
+1: call 2f
+ ret
+ int3
+
+ .align 64
+2: mov $5, %eax
+
+3: jmp 4f
+ int3
+
+4: sub $1, %eax
+ jnz 3b
+
+ sub $1, %ecx
+ jnz 1b
+
+ ret
+5:
+ /*
+ * The Intel sequence has an LFENCE here. The purpose is to ensure
+ * that all prior branches have executed, before dispatching a
+ * subsequent indirect branch.
+ *
+ * Xen's SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_* blocks have safety LFENCEs at the end when
+ * protections are active, which suffices for this purpose.
+ */
+
+ ret
+
+ .size clear_bhb_loops, . - clear_bhb_loops
+ .type clear_bhb_loops, @function
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
index 96b3d22080..7233e771d8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ ENTRY(vmx_asm_vmexit_handler)
wrmsr
.endm
ALTERNATIVE "", restore_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI. Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+ * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+ */
+ testb $SCF_entry_bhb, CPUINFO_scf(%rsp)
+ jz .L_skip_bhb
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS, \
+ "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L_skip_bhb:
+
ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX
/* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 3c57f55de0..7a312c485e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_has(unsigned int feat)
#define cpu_bug_fpu_ptrs boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS)
#define cpu_bug_null_seg boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)
+#define cpu_has_bhb_seq (boot_cpu_has(X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX) || \
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS))
+
enum _cache_type {
CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0,
CACHE_TYPE_DATA = 1,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 6422c66b0f..bada8912e0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -56,5 +56,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM, X86_SYNTH(29)) /*
MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for
#define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR X86_BUG(17) /* (No) safety LFENCE for
SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_INTR. */
#define X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX X86_BUG(18) /* (No) safety LFENCE for
SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_VMX. */
+#define X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX X86_BUG(19) /* Use clear_bhb_tsx for BHI
mitigation. */
+#define X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS X86_BUG(20) /* Use clear_bhb_loops for BHI
mitigation.*/
+
/* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */
#define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words
worth of info */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
index b2d2c25842..72347ef2b9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#define SCF_verw (1 << 3)
#define SCF_ist_ibpb (1 << 4)
#define SCF_entry_ibpb (1 << 5)
+#define SCF_entry_bhb (1 << 6)
/*
* The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context. Some
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@
* Some speculative protections are per-domain. These settings are merged
* into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path.
*/
-#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb)
+#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb | SCF_entry_bhb)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h
index f697d17616..989ff67db5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h
@@ -273,6 +273,17 @@
ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0), \
X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
+ /*
+ * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI. Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+ * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+ */
+ testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+ jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS, \
+ "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV
.endm
@@ -311,6 +322,13 @@
ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1), \
X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV
+ testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+ jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS, \
+ "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
ALTERNATIVE "lfence", "", X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR
.endm
@@ -411,6 +429,18 @@
.L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl:
+ /*
+ * Clear the BHB to mitigate BHI. Used on eIBRS parts, and uses RETs
+ * itself so must be after we've perfomed all the RET-safety we can.
+ */
+ testb $SCF_entry_bhb, %bl
+ jz .L\@_skip_bhb
+
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ "call clear_bhb_loops", X86_SPEC_BHB_LOOPS, \
+ "call clear_bhb_tsx", X86_SPEC_BHB_TSX
+.L\@_skip_bhb:
+
lfence
.endm
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 6a1eb14cdf..131127d856 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -2182,38 +2182,43 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
/*
* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV conditional safety
*
- * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
- * unconditional WRMSR as the last action.
+ * A BHB sequence, if used, is a conditional action and last. If we
+ * have this, then we must have the LFENCE.
*
- * If we have it, or we're not using any prior conditional mitigation,
- * then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
+ * Otherwise, DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
+ * unconditional WRMSR. If we do have it, or we're not using any
+ * prior conditional block, then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) )
+ if ( !cpu_has_bhb_seq &&
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV)) )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_PV);
/*
* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR conditional safety
*
- * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
- * unconditional WRMSR as the last action.
+ * A BHB sequence, if used, is a conditional action and last. If we
+ * have this, then we must have the LFENCE.
*
- * If we have it, or we have no protections active in the block that
- * is skipped when interrupting guest context, then it's safe to drop
- * the LFENCE.
+ * Otherwise DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY (X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV if used) is an
+ * unconditional WRMSR. If we have it, or we have no protections
+ * active in the block that is skipped when interrupting guest
+ * context, then it's safe to drop the LFENCE.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
- (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV)) )
+ if ( !cpu_has_bhb_seq &&
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ||
+ (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV))) )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_INTR);
/*
* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_VMX conditional safety
*
- * Currently there are no safety actions with conditional branches, so
- * no need for the extra safety LFENCE.
+ * A BHB sequence, if used, is the only conditional action, so if we
+ * don't have it, we don't need the safety LFENCE.
*/
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX);
+ if ( !cpu_has_bhb_seq )
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_SPEC_NO_LFENCE_ENTRY_VMX);
}
/*
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.18
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