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[xen staging] x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate()



commit b20e3fbc3ec91b4534e51f6f724c3826dac0bdf3
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200

    x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate()
    
    While of little effect right here, future patches (AVX10, AMX,
    KeyLocker) will benefit more significantly.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c 
b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
index 0a6d5a35b1..53742b4796 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c
@@ -1233,6 +1233,7 @@ x86_emulate(
 {
     /* Shadow copy of register state. Committed on successful emulation. */
     struct cpu_user_regs _regs = *ctxt->regs;
+    const struct cpu_policy *cp = ctxt->cpu_policy;
     struct x86_emulate_state state;
     int rc;
     uint8_t b, d, *opc = NULL;
@@ -3075,7 +3076,7 @@ x86_emulate(
          * in fact risking to make guest OSes vulnerable to the equivalent of
          * XSA-7 (CVE-2012-0217).
          */
-        generate_exception_if(ctxt->cpuid->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+        generate_exception_if(cp->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
                               op_bytes == 8 && 
!is_canonical_address(_regs.rcx),
                               X86_EXC_GP, 0);
 #endif
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging



 


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