[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging] x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate()
commit b20e3fbc3ec91b4534e51f6f724c3826dac0bdf3 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Wed Sep 4 16:06:42 2024 +0200 x86emul: introduce a struct cpu_policy * local in x86_emulate() While of little effect right here, future patches (AVX10, AMX, KeyLocker) will benefit more significantly. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c index 0a6d5a35b1..53742b4796 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c @@ -1233,6 +1233,7 @@ x86_emulate( { /* Shadow copy of register state. Committed on successful emulation. */ struct cpu_user_regs _regs = *ctxt->regs; + const struct cpu_policy *cp = ctxt->cpu_policy; struct x86_emulate_state state; int rc; uint8_t b, d, *opc = NULL; @@ -3075,7 +3076,7 @@ x86_emulate( * in fact risking to make guest OSes vulnerable to the equivalent of * XSA-7 (CVE-2012-0217). */ - generate_exception_if(ctxt->cpuid->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && + generate_exception_if(cp->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && op_bytes == 8 && !is_canonical_address(_regs.rcx), X86_EXC_GP, 0); #endif -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging
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