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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen staging] x86/spec-ctrl: Update vendor/family/model logic
commit c82a67a9ae0dfe2440b503e11d593f0610096004
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Jul 18 15:43:13 2025 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Mon Jul 21 12:40:11 2025 +0100
x86/spec-ctrl: Update vendor/family/model logic
Switch to the new fields and constants.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index bcdae1ed23..feae0d710f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ int8_t __ro_after_init opt_xpti_domu = -1;
static __init void xpti_init_default(void)
{
- if ( (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ||
+ if ( (boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ||
cpu_has_rdcl_no )
{
if ( opt_xpti_hwdom < 0 )
@@ -712,8 +712,8 @@ static bool __init check_smt_enabled(void)
* At the time of writing, it is almost completely undocumented, so isn't
* virtualised reliably.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf && !cpu_has_hypervisor &&
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 0xf && !cpu_has_hypervisor &&
!rdmsr_safe(MSR_INTEL_CORE_THREAD_COUNT, val) )
return (MASK_EXTR(val, MSR_CTC_CORE_MASK) !=
MASK_EXTR(val, MSR_CTC_THREAD_MASK));
@@ -738,11 +738,11 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev;
bool safe = false;
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
return true;
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return false;
/*
@@ -793,8 +793,8 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
{
printk(XENLOG_ERR
"FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: RSBA %u, EIBRS
%u, RRSBA %u\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model,
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, ucode_rev,
+ boot_cpu_data.family, boot_cpu_data.model,
+ boot_cpu_data.stepping, ucode_rev,
cpu_has_rsba, cpu_has_eibrs, cpu_has_rrsba);
add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC);
}
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
if ( cpu_has_arch_caps )
return true;
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
case 0x17: /* Penryn */
case 0x1d: /* Dunnington */
@@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
case 0x4f: /* Broadwell EP/EX */
safe = ucode_rev >= 0xb000021; break;
case 0x56: /* Broadwell D */
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.stepping )
{
case 2: safe = ucode_rev >= 0x15; break;
case 3: safe = ucode_rev >= 0x7000012; break;
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
case 5: safe = ucode_rev >= 0xe000009; break;
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU stepping %#x - assuming not reptpoline
safe\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask);
+ boot_cpu_data.stepping);
safe = false;
break;
}
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming not reptpoline safe\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
+ boot_cpu_data.model);
safe = false;
break;
}
@@ -938,11 +938,11 @@ static bool __init retpoline_calculations(void)
*/
static bool __init rsb_is_full_width(void)
{
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return true;
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
case 0x37: /* Baytrail / Valleyview (Silvermont) */
case 0x4a: /* Merrifield */
@@ -966,11 +966,11 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
* Assume all unrecognised processors are ok. This is only known to
* affect Intel Family 6 processors.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return false;
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
/*
* Core processors since at least Nehalem are vulnerable.
@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming vulnerable to LazyFPU\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
+ boot_cpu_data.model);
return true;
}
}
@@ -1033,8 +1033,7 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void)
*/
static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled)
{
- if ( !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor &
- (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
+ if ( !(boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
return;
/*
@@ -1044,7 +1043,7 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled)
if ( cpu_has_hypervisor )
return;
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.family == 0x19 )
{
/*
* We could have a table of models/microcode revisions. ...or we
@@ -1059,7 +1058,7 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled)
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"Vulnerable to SRSO, without suitable microcode to
mitigate\n");
}
- else if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 )
+ else if ( boot_cpu_data.family < 0x19 )
{
/*
* Zen1/2 (which have the IBPB microcode) have IBPB_BRTYPE behaviour
@@ -1084,7 +1083,7 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool hw_smt_enabled)
* they can be altered at runtime so it's not safe to presume SRSO_NO.
*/
if ( !hw_smt_enabled &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 || boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x18) )
+ (boot_cpu_data.family == 0x17 || boot_cpu_data.family == 0x18) )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
}
@@ -1100,11 +1099,10 @@ static void __init srso_calculations(bool
hw_smt_enabled)
*/
static bool __init has_div_vuln(void)
{
- if ( !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor &
- (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
+ if ( !(boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) )
return false;
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x18 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.family != 0x17 && boot_cpu_data.family != 0x18 )
return false;
return is_zen1_uarch();
@@ -1139,7 +1137,7 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(void)
return;
}
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) )
{
/*
* AMD/Hygon CPUs to date (June 2022) don't flush the RAS. Future
@@ -1224,10 +1222,10 @@ static __init void l1tf_calculations(void)
l1d_maxphysaddr = paddr_bits;
/* L1TF is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
- boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.family == 6 )
{
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
/*
* Core processors since at least Penryn are vulnerable.
@@ -1303,7 +1301,7 @@ static __init void l1tf_calculations(void)
if ( cpu_has_bug_l1tf && hit_default )
printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming vulnerable to L1TF\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
+ boot_cpu_data.model);
/*
* L1TF safe address heuristics. These apply to the real hardware we are
@@ -1360,15 +1358,15 @@ static __init void l1tf_calculations(void)
static __init void mds_calculations(void)
{
/* MDS is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return;
/* Any processor advertising MDS_NO should be not vulnerable to MDS. */
if ( cpu_has_mds_no )
return;
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
/*
* Core processors since at least Nehalem are vulnerable.
@@ -1401,17 +1399,17 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(void)
* Some Core processors have per-stepping vulnerability.
*/
case 0x55: /* Skylake-X / Cascade Lake */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 5 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.stepping <= 5 )
cpu_has_bug_mds = true;
break;
case 0x8e: /* Kaby / Coffee / Whiskey Lake M */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 0xb )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.stepping <= 0xb )
cpu_has_bug_mds = true;
break;
case 0x9e: /* Kaby / Coffee / Whiskey Lake D */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_mask <= 0xc )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.stepping <= 0xc )
cpu_has_bug_mds = true;
break;
@@ -1444,7 +1442,7 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(void)
default:
printk("Unrecognised CPU model %#x - assuming vulnerable to MDS\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
+ boot_cpu_data.model);
cpu_has_bug_mds = true;
break;
}
@@ -1471,8 +1469,8 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(void)
static void __init rfds_calculations(void)
{
/* RFDS is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return;
/*
@@ -1490,10 +1488,10 @@ static void __init rfds_calculations(void)
* Not all CPUs are expected to get a microcode update enumerating one of
* RFDS_{NO,CLEAR}, or we might have out-of-date microcode.
*/
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.vfm )
{
- case INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE:
+ case INTEL_ALDERLAKE:
+ case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE:
/*
* Alder Lake and Raptor Lake might be a client SKU (with the
* Gracemont cores active, and therefore vulnerable) or might be a
@@ -1505,17 +1503,17 @@ static void __init rfds_calculations(void)
if ( !cpu_has_hybrid )
break;
fallthrough;
- case INTEL_FAM6_ALDERLAKE_L:
- case INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P:
- case INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S:
-
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT: /* Apollo Lake */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D: /* Denverton */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS: /* Gemini Lake */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_D: /* Snow Ridge / Parker Ridge */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT: /* Elkhart Lake */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_TREMONT_L: /* Jasper Lake */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GRACEMONT: /* Alder Lake N */
+ case INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P:
+ case INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S:
+
+ case INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT: /* Apollo Lake */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D: /* Denverton */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS: /* Gemini Lake */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D: /* Snow Ridge / Parker Ridge */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT: /* Elkhart Lake */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L: /* Jasper Lake */
+ case INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT: /* Alder Lake N */
return;
}
@@ -1537,7 +1535,7 @@ static void __init tsa_calculations(void)
unsigned int curr_rev, min_rev;
/* TSA is only known to affect AMD processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD )
return;
/* If we're virtualised, don't attempt to synthesise anything. */
@@ -1556,7 +1554,7 @@ static void __init tsa_calculations(void)
* ... otherwise, synthesise them. CPUs other than Fam19 (Zen3/4) are
* stated to be not vulnerable.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0x19 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.family != 0x19 )
{
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO);
@@ -1589,8 +1587,8 @@ static void __init tsa_calculations(void)
default:
printk(XENLOG_WARNING
"Unrecognised CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x for TSA
mitigation\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model,
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, curr_rev);
+ boot_cpu_data.family, boot_cpu_data.model,
+ boot_cpu_data.stepping, curr_rev);
return;
}
@@ -1631,7 +1629,7 @@ static bool __init cpu_has_gds(void)
* Cove (Alder Lake, Sapphire Rapids). Broadwell and older, and the Atom
* line, and all hybrid parts are unaffected.
*/
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.model )
{
case 0x55: /* Skylake/Cascade Lake/Cooper Lake SP */
case 0x6a: /* Ice Lake SP */
@@ -1661,8 +1659,8 @@ static void __init gds_calculations(void)
bool cpu_has_bug_gds, mitigated = false;
/* GDS is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return;
cpu_has_bug_gds = cpu_has_gds();
@@ -1684,8 +1682,8 @@ static void __init gds_calculations(void)
*/
printk(XENLOG_ERR
"FIRMWARE BUG: CPU %02x-%02x-%02x, ucode 0x%08x: GDS_CTRL
&& GDS_NO\n",
- boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model,
- boot_cpu_data.x86_mask, this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev);
+ boot_cpu_data.family, boot_cpu_data.model,
+ boot_cpu_data.stepping, this_cpu(cpu_sig).rev);
return add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC);
}
@@ -1756,8 +1754,8 @@ static void __init gds_calculations(void)
static bool __init cpu_has_bug_bhi(void)
{
/* BHI is only known to affect Intel Family 6 processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
- boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.family != 6 )
return false;
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_NO) )
@@ -1880,7 +1878,7 @@ static void __init its_calculations(void)
return;
/* ITS is only known to affect Intel processors at this time. */
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL )
return;
/*
@@ -1890,27 +1888,27 @@ static void __init its_calculations(void)
* - those with BHI_CTRL
* but we still need to synthesise ITS_NO.
*/
- if ( boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 || !cpu_has_eibrs ||
+ if ( boot_cpu_data.family != 6 || !cpu_has_eibrs ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL) )
goto synthesise;
- switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
+ switch ( boot_cpu_data.vfm )
{
/* These Skylake-uarch cores suffer cases #2 and #3. */
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
- case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_COMETLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_SKYLAKE_X:
+ case INTEL_KABYLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_KABYLAKE:
+ case INTEL_COMETLAKE:
+ case INTEL_COMETLAKE_L:
return;
/* These Sunny/Willow/Cypress Cove cores suffer case #3. */
- case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X:
- case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D:
- case INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L:
- case INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L:
- case INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE:
- case INTEL_FAM6_ROCKETLAKE:
+ case INTEL_ICELAKE_X:
+ case INTEL_ICELAKE_D:
+ case INTEL_ICELAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_TIGERLAKE:
+ case INTEL_ROCKETLAKE:
return;
default:
@@ -2183,8 +2181,8 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
* before going idle is less overhead than flushing on PV entry.
*/
if ( !opt_rsb_pv && hw_smt_enabled &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD|X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) &&
- (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x17 || boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x18) )
+ (boot_cpu_data.vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.family == 0x17 || boot_cpu_data.family == 0x18) )
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_IDLE);
}
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging
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