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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen master] x86/msr: Split out guest-msr.h
commit ef745a2d014d2969a89a430cf8b34fa696d0adc4
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Aug 15 15:06:10 2025 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Aug 19 19:52:48 2025 +0100
x86/msr: Split out guest-msr.h
struct vcpu_msrs has a very different purpose to everything else in msr.h
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/debug.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/domain.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest-msr.h | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 145 --------------------------------
xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.h | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
15 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
index da05015578..a66cd5f9c7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/cpu-policy.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/idt.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/match-cpu.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
index 8dc68945f7..b63a82dd38 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <asm/cpu-policy.h>
#include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/viridian.h>
#include <asm/xstate.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/debug.c b/xen/arch/x86/debug.c
index 71755dea6f..11b0a7e547 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/debug.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/debug.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
/*
* Merge new bits into dr6. 'new' is always given in positive polarity,
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index 4c7231230a..dbf2ff14f5 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/cpuidle.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index d7781b7dc5..6153e3c07e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/cpu-policy.h>
#include <asm/gdbsx.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/emulate.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/io_apic.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 6d2b937b62..bd64faf207 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/e820.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hap.h>
#include <asm/hvm/cacheattr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/emulate.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index 62f455ad94..6aac83b5f9 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/gdbsx.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/emulate.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/io.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
index 153aa34133..c57d314a24 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <xen/sched.h>
#include <xen/softirq.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h>
#include <asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 3e21f20278..4934449577 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/event.h>
#include <asm/gdbsx.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/emulate.h>
#include <asm/hvm/hvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/monitor.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
index 95d3c2ee7b..6201665d9f 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <xen/ioreq.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/support.h>
#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmx.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest-msr.h
b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest-msr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f0cb0a939
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/guest-msr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+#ifndef X86_GUEST_MSR_H
+#define X86_GUEST_MSR_H
+
+#include <xen/types.h>
+
+/* Container object for per-vCPU MSRs */
+struct vcpu_msrs
+{
+ /*
+ * 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+ * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)
+ *
+ * For PV guests, this holds the guest kernel value. It is accessed on
+ * every entry/exit path.
+ *
+ * For VT-x guests, one of two situations exist:
+ *
+ * - If hardware supports virtualized MSR_SPEC_CTRL, it is active by
+ * default and the guest value lives in the VMCS.
+ * - Otherwise, the guest value is held in the MSR load/save list.
+ *
+ * For SVM, the guest value lives in the VMCB, and hardware saves/restores
+ * the host value automatically. However, guests run with the OR of the
+ * host and guest value, which allows Xen to set protections behind the
+ * guest's back.
+ *
+ * We must clear/restore Xen's value before/after VMRUN to avoid unduly
+ * influencing the guest. In order to support "behind the guest's back"
+ * protections, we load this value (commonly 0) before VMRUN.
+ *
+ * Once of such "behind the guest's back" usages is setting SPEC_CTRL.SSBD
+ * if the guest sets VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.
+ */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t raw;
+ } spec_ctrl;
+
+ /*
+ * 0x00000140 - MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES
+ *
+ * This MSR is non-architectural, but for simplicy we allow it to be read
+ * unconditionally. The CPUID Faulting bit is the only writeable bit, and
+ * only if enumerated by MSR_PLATFORM_INFO.
+ */
+ union {
+ uint32_t raw;
+ struct {
+ bool cpuid_faulting:1;
+ };
+ } misc_features_enables;
+
+ /*
+ * 0x00000560 ... 57x - MSR_RTIT_*
+ *
+ * "Real Time Instruction Trace", now called Processor Trace.
+ *
+ * These MSRs are not exposed to guests. They are controlled by Xen
+ * behind the scenes, when vmtrace is enabled for the domain.
+ *
+ * MSR_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE not stored here. It is fixed per vcpu, and
+ * derived from v->vmtrace.buf.
+ */
+ struct {
+ /*
+ * Placed in the MSR load/save lists. Only modified by hypercall in
+ * the common case.
+ */
+ uint64_t ctl;
+
+ /*
+ * Updated by hardware in non-root mode. Synchronised here on vcpu
+ * context switch.
+ */
+ uint64_t status;
+ union {
+ uint64_t output_mask;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t output_limit;
+ uint32_t output_offset;
+ };
+ };
+ } rtit;
+
+ /*
+ * 0x000006e1 - MSR_PKRS - Protection Key Supervisor.
+ *
+ * Exposed R/W to guests. Xen doesn't use PKS yet, so only context
+ * switched per vcpu. When in current context, live value is in hardware,
+ * and this value is stale.
+ */
+ uint32_t pkrs;
+
+ /* 0x00000da0 - MSR_IA32_XSS */
+ struct {
+ uint64_t raw;
+ } xss;
+
+ /*
+ * 0xc0000103 - MSR_TSC_AUX
+ *
+ * Value is guest chosen, and always loaded in vcpu context. Guests have
+ * no direct MSR access, and the value is accessible to userspace with the
+ * RDTSCP and RDPID instructions.
+ */
+ uint32_t tsc_aux;
+
+ /*
+ * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if !X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)
+ *
+ * AMD only, used on Zen1 and older hardware (pre-AMD_SSBD). Holds the
+ * the guests value.
+ *
+ * In the default case, Xen doesn't protect itself from SSB, and guests
+ * are expected to use VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD=1 sparingly. Xen therefore
+ * runs in the guest kernel's choice of SSBD.
+ *
+ * However, if the global enable `spec-ctrl=ssbd` is selected, hardware is
+ * always configured with SSBD=1 and the guest's setting is never loaded
+ * into hardware.
+ */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t raw;
+ } virt_spec_ctrl;
+
+ /*
+ * 0xc00110{27,19-1b} MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK
+ *
+ * Loaded into hardware for guests which have active %dr7 settings.
+ * Furthermore, HVM guests are offered direct access, meaning that the
+ * values here may be stale in current context.
+ */
+ uint32_t dr_mask[4];
+};
+
+struct vcpu;
+struct cpu_policy;
+
+int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v);
+
+/*
+ * Below functions can return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE which means that MSR is
+ * not (yet) handled by it and must be processed by legacy handlers. Such
+ * behaviour is needed for transition period until all rd/wrmsr are handled
+ * by the new MSR infrastructure.
+ *
+ * These functions are also used by the migration logic, so need to cope with
+ * being used outside of v's context.
+ */
+int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val);
+int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val);
+
+uint64_t msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(const struct cpu_policy *cp);
+
+#endif /* X86_GUEST_MSR_H */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
index e185db0967..06afdb460a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -273,149 +273,4 @@ static inline void wrmsr_tsc_aux(uint32_t val)
}
}
-uint64_t msr_spec_ctrl_valid_bits(const struct cpu_policy *cp);
-
-/* Container object for per-vCPU MSRs */
-struct vcpu_msrs
-{
- /*
- * 0x00000048 - MSR_SPEC_CTRL
- * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)
- *
- * For PV guests, this holds the guest kernel value. It is accessed on
- * every entry/exit path.
- *
- * For VT-x guests, one of two situations exist:
- *
- * - If hardware supports virtualized MSR_SPEC_CTRL, it is active by
- * default and the guest value lives in the VMCS.
- * - Otherwise, the guest value is held in the MSR load/save list.
- *
- * For SVM, the guest value lives in the VMCB, and hardware saves/restores
- * the host value automatically. However, guests run with the OR of the
- * host and guest value, which allows Xen to set protections behind the
- * guest's back.
- *
- * We must clear/restore Xen's value before/after VMRUN to avoid unduly
- * influencing the guest. In order to support "behind the guest's back"
- * protections, we load this value (commonly 0) before VMRUN.
- *
- * Once of such "behind the guest's back" usages is setting SPEC_CTRL.SSBD
- * if the guest sets VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD.
- */
- struct {
- uint32_t raw;
- } spec_ctrl;
-
- /*
- * 0x00000140 - MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES
- *
- * This MSR is non-architectural, but for simplicy we allow it to be read
- * unconditionally. The CPUID Faulting bit is the only writeable bit, and
- * only if enumerated by MSR_PLATFORM_INFO.
- */
- union {
- uint32_t raw;
- struct {
- bool cpuid_faulting:1;
- };
- } misc_features_enables;
-
- /*
- * 0x00000560 ... 57x - MSR_RTIT_*
- *
- * "Real Time Instruction Trace", now called Processor Trace.
- *
- * These MSRs are not exposed to guests. They are controlled by Xen
- * behind the scenes, when vmtrace is enabled for the domain.
- *
- * MSR_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE not stored here. It is fixed per vcpu, and
- * derived from v->vmtrace.buf.
- */
- struct {
- /*
- * Placed in the MSR load/save lists. Only modified by hypercall in
- * the common case.
- */
- uint64_t ctl;
-
- /*
- * Updated by hardware in non-root mode. Synchronised here on vcpu
- * context switch.
- */
- uint64_t status;
- union {
- uint64_t output_mask;
- struct {
- uint32_t output_limit;
- uint32_t output_offset;
- };
- };
- } rtit;
-
- /*
- * 0x000006e1 - MSR_PKRS - Protection Key Supervisor.
- *
- * Exposed R/W to guests. Xen doesn't use PKS yet, so only context
- * switched per vcpu. When in current context, live value is in hardware,
- * and this value is stale.
- */
- uint32_t pkrs;
-
- /* 0x00000da0 - MSR_IA32_XSS */
- struct {
- uint64_t raw;
- } xss;
-
- /*
- * 0xc0000103 - MSR_TSC_AUX
- *
- * Value is guest chosen, and always loaded in vcpu context. Guests have
- * no direct MSR access, and the value is accessible to userspace with the
- * RDTSCP and RDPID instructions.
- */
- uint32_t tsc_aux;
-
- /*
- * 0xc001011f - MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (if !X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)
- *
- * AMD only, used on Zen1 and older hardware (pre-AMD_SSBD). Holds the
- * the guests value.
- *
- * In the default case, Xen doesn't protect itself from SSB, and guests
- * are expected to use VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD=1 sparingly. Xen therefore
- * runs in the guest kernel's choice of SSBD.
- *
- * However, if the global enable `spec-ctrl=ssbd` is selected, hardware is
- * always configured with SSBD=1 and the guest's setting is never loaded
- * into hardware.
- */
- struct {
- uint32_t raw;
- } virt_spec_ctrl;
-
- /*
- * 0xc00110{27,19-1b} MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK
- *
- * Loaded into hardware for guests which have active %dr7 settings.
- * Furthermore, HVM guests are offered direct access, meaning that the
- * values here may be stale in current context.
- */
- uint32_t dr_mask[4];
-};
-
-int init_vcpu_msr_policy(struct vcpu *v);
-
-/*
- * Below functions can return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE which means that MSR is
- * not (yet) handled by it and must be processed by legacy handlers. Such
- * behaviour is needed for transition period until all rd/wrmsr are handled
- * by the new MSR infrastructure.
- *
- * These functions are also used by the migration logic, so need to cope with
- * being used outside of v's context.
- */
-int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val);
-int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val);
-
#endif /* __ASM_MSR_H */
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
index 1bf117cbd8..c6465b41ee 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/amd.h>
#include <asm/cpu-policy.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/hvm/nestedhvm.h>
#include <asm/hvm/viridian.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.h b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.h
index 49a4d34832..c74e45e50c 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/emulate.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <xen/sched.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/x86_emulate.h>
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
index 2258b4ce1b..9d45364026 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/asm-offsets.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <asm/hardirq.h>
#include <xen/multiboot.h>
#include <xen/multiboot2.h>
+#include <asm/guest-msr.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_VIDEO
# include "../boot/video.h"
--
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