[xen staging] domctl: move XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission handling to x86 code

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 345ca8b6e74769f95acd3e7853ff84f460bd0dc3
Author:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Jun 16 14:16:33 2026 +0200
Commit:     Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Jun 16 14:16:33 2026 +0200

    domctl: move XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission handling to x86 code
    
    HAS_PIRQ is selected by x86 only, and that's expected to remain that way.
    Avoid the #ifdef needed by moving the logic to arch_do_domctl(). Leverage
    "currd" being available as a local variable there while doing so.
    
    Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/common/domctl.c   | 33 +--------------------------------
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
index 0e9a253288..d1bd753481 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
@@ -258,6 +258,36 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
         break;
     }
 
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
+    {
+        unsigned int pirq = domctl->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
+        bool allow = domctl->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
+
+        ret = -EINVAL;
+        if ( pirq >= currd->nr_pirqs )
+            break;
+
+        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(currd, pirq);
+
+        ret = -EPERM;
+        if ( irq )
+            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
+        if ( ret )
+            break;
+
+        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
+
+        if ( !irq_access_permitted(currd, irq) )
+            ret = -EPERM;
+        else if ( allow )
+            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
+        else
+            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
+
+        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
+        break;
+    }
+
     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
     {
         int irq;
diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c
index 6f71a68d51..23406548c1 100644
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
@@ -473,38 +473,6 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) 
u_domctl)
         goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
     }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HAS_PIRQ
-    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
-    {
-        unsigned int pirq = op->u.irq_permission.pirq, irq;
-        bool allow = op->u.irq_permission.allow_access;
-
-        ret = -EINVAL;
-        if ( pirq >= current->domain->nr_pirqs )
-            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-
-        irq = domain_pirq_to_irq(current->domain, pirq);
-
-        ret = -EPERM;
-        if ( irq )
-            ret = xsm_irq_permission(XSM_PRIV, d, irq, allow);
-        if ( ret )
-            goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-
-        iocaps_double_lock(d, true);
-
-        if ( !irq_access_permitted(current->domain, irq) )
-            ret = -EPERM;
-        else if ( allow )
-            ret = irq_permit_access(d, irq);
-        else
-            ret = irq_deny_access(d, irq);
-
-        iocaps_double_unlock(d, true);
-        goto domctl_out_unlock_domonly;
-    }
-#endif
-
     case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
     {
         struct domain *e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
@@ -565,6 +533,7 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) 
u_domctl)
 
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping:
+    case XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_gsi_permission:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_bind_pt_irq:
     case XEN_DOMCTL_unbind_pt_irq:
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging