[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

RE: [Xen-users] Xen Security


  • To: "Bart Coninckx" <bart.coninckx@xxxxxxxxxx>, <xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Jonathan Tripathy" <jonnyt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2010 11:27:46 +0100
  • Cc:
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 16 Jul 2010 03:32:14 -0700
  • List-id: Xen user discussion <xen-users.lists.xensource.com>
  • Thread-index: Acsk0Jnreco70SbcRq+if4EbQcFQ/gAAO6QM
  • Thread-topic: [Xen-users] Xen Security


I think the challenges are bigger than with separate physicals boxes. You have
to approach from a theoretical point of view. It's not that because there are
no breaches or exploits today, that there will never be. The theory is this:
maximum seclusion is maximum security. Two separate boxes in two separate
networks in let's say two separate buildings (physical security is also part
of the game)  will be the most secure. Xen presents an exception to this: the
seclusion is created by software. In theory it is the same thing as physical
seclusion, until the software fails or is compromised.
Another thing is human error: you WILL make mistakes. One of those mistakes
may open open the wrong port, erase the wrong LUN, bridge the wrong NIC. I've
done quite some security in my time and the biggest problem is always human
error. We need to humbly acknowledge this.
In short: it's certainly a bigger risk, but the consequences of compromising
your server might lead you to accept this risk.
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
I 100% agree with you on this :) By splitting things up, you can limit the "damage zone".  And I can see what you mean about the human area - you really need your head screwed on when working with all this stuff!
 
Do people on this list generally trust Xen with their private data, mixed with public VMs? The folks over at Slicehost, Amazon etc.. seem to...


_______________________________________________
Xen-users mailing list
Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-users

 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.