[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Publicity] Docker Open Source Container Virtualization on the Rise
On 12 Feb 2014, at 08:44, Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Tue, 2014-02-11 at 19:42 +0000, Anil Madhavapeddy wrote: >> Perhaps the simplest thing is to look for a list of recent CVE >> vulnerabilities and highlight which ones would be blocked by Xen, KVM >> and containers. > > One thing worth remembering is that while Xen has a well defined > security response process[0] and is proactive and transparent about > issuing advisories (and CVEs) for anything which we become aware of, > even relatively minor issues, while I don't believe the same can be said > of Linux and by extension containers. > > AFAIK security fixes to Linux are made, deliberately and explicitly, in > a very low key way and appear as any other bugfix. They are not > highlighted as security relevant and mention of a CVE or security aspect > is routinely stripped from the commit log comments. CVEs are issued > after the fact, if at all, when someone who is watching the commit > stream spots it, realises the security impact, and requests it for > themselves/their distro/etc or when the original author does so > independently. > > So the risk is that Xen CVEs will be over represented in the set of > CVEs. On the other hand maybe the sheer volume of CVEs means that even > if they are under reported there are loads of them anyway... I think that's an excellent point. The flipside is to look at exploit sets instead, which are basically independent of security processes. A quick look at Metasploit shows this collection: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/tree/master/modules ...which sadly (?) doesn't include Xen or KVM, or any other hypervisors, but I'm sure there must be a similar set elsewhere. -anil _______________________________________________ Publicity mailing list Publicity@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xenproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/publicity
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