[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.2] x86: clear EFLAGS.NT in SYSENTER entry path
commit 68a30a91bad2d4ff1f7c0d4302ec1060d573f6da Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Thu Apr 18 16:18:42 2013 +0200 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Thu Apr 18 16:18:42 2013 +0200 x86: clear EFLAGS.NT in SYSENTER entry path ... as it causes problems if we happen to exit back via IRET: In the course of trying to handle the fault, the hypervisor creates a stack frame by hand, and uses PUSHFQ to set the respective EFLAGS field, but expects to be able to IRET through that stack frame to the second portion of the fixup code (which causes a #GP due to the stored EFLAGS having NT set). And even if this worked (e.g if we cleared NT in that path), it would then (through the fail safe callback) cause a #GP in the guest with the SYSENTER handler's first instruction as the source, which in turn would allow guest user mode code to crash the guest kernel. Inject a #GP on the fake (NULL) address of the SYSENTER instruction instead, just like in the case where the guest kernel didn't register a corresponding entry point. This is CVE-2013-1917 / XSA-44. Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> master commit: fdac9515607b757c044e7ef0d61b1453ef999b08 master date: 2013-04-18 16:00:35 +0200 --- xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c | 8 ++++++-- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c index d13bed0..f2e2133 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/suspend.c @@ -81,8 +81,12 @@ void restore_rest_processor_state(void) } #else /* !defined(CONFIG_X86_64) */ - if ( supervisor_mode_kernel && cpu_has_sep ) - wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &this_cpu(init_tss).esp1, 0); + if ( cpu_has_sep ) + { + wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, 0, 0); + if ( supervisor_mode_kernel ) + wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &this_cpu(init_tss).esp1, 0); + } #endif /* Maybe load the debug registers. */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c index a287816..321d942 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c @@ -655,8 +655,11 @@ void __cpuinit cpu_init(void) #if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) t->ss0 = __HYPERVISOR_DS; t->esp0 = get_stack_bottom(); - if ( supervisor_mode_kernel && cpu_has_sep ) + if ( cpu_has_sep ) { + wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, 0, 0); + if ( supervisor_mode_kernel ) wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, &t->esp1, 0); + } #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_64) /* Bottom-of-stack must be 16-byte aligned! */ BUG_ON((get_stack_bottom() & 15) != 0); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S index 8390db2..c606599 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S @@ -285,7 +285,14 @@ sysenter_eflags_saved: cmpb $0,VCPU_sysenter_disables_events(%rbx) movq VCPU_sysenter_addr(%rbx),%rax setne %cl + testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT,UREGS_eflags(%rsp) leaq VCPU_trap_bounce(%rbx),%rdx +UNLIKELY_START(nz, sysenter_nt_set) + pushfq + andl $~X86_EFLAGS_NT,(%rsp) + popfq + xorl %eax,%eax +UNLIKELY_END(sysenter_nt_set) testq %rax,%rax leal (,%rcx,TBF_INTERRUPT),%ecx UNLIKELY_START(z, sysenter_gpf) -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.2 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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