[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/HVM: make hvm_efer_valid() honor guest features
commit e70c3da4d02790f9144e6b455f0d67b868c09557 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Jan 23 15:13:05 2015 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Jan 23 15:13:05 2015 +0100 x86/HVM: make hvm_efer_valid() honor guest features Following the earlier similar change validating CR4 modifications. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 24f3333..2162f97 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1683,20 +1683,64 @@ static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) return 0; } -static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct domain *d, - uint64_t value, uint64_t efer_validbits) +static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value, + signed int cr0_pg) { - if ( nestedhvm_enabled(d) && cpu_has_svm ) - efer_validbits |= EFER_SVME; + unsigned int ext1_ecx = 0, ext1_edx = 0; - return !((value & ~efer_validbits) || - ((sizeof(long) != 8) && (value & EFER_LME)) || - (!cpu_has_svm && (value & EFER_SVME)) || - (!cpu_has_nx && (value & EFER_NX)) || - (!cpu_has_syscall && (value & EFER_SCE)) || - (!cpu_has_lmsl && (value & EFER_LMSLE)) || - (!cpu_has_ffxsr && (value & EFER_FFXSE)) || - ((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA)); + if ( cr0_pg < 0 && !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) ) + { + unsigned int level; + + ASSERT(v == current); + hvm_cpuid(0x80000000, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if ( level >= 0x80000001 ) + { + unsigned int dummy; + + level = 0x80000001; + hvm_funcs.cpuid_intercept(&level, &dummy, &ext1_ecx, &ext1_edx); + } + } + else + { + ext1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_LM / 32]; + ext1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_SVM / 32]; + } + + /* + * Guests may want to set EFER.SCE and EFER.LME at the same time, so we + * can't make the check depend on only X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL (which on VMX + * will be clear without the guest having entered 64-bit mode). + */ + if ( (value & EFER_SCE) && + !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)) && + (cr0_pg >= 0 || !(value & EFER_LME)) ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & (EFER_LME | EFER_LMA)) && + !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_LM)) ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & EFER_LMA) && (!(value & EFER_LME) || !cr0_pg) ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & EFER_NX) && !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_NX)) ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & EFER_SVME) && + (!(ext1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) || + !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & EFER_LMSLE) && !cpu_has_lmsl ) + return 0; + + if ( (value & EFER_FFXSE) && + !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FFXSR)) ) + return 0; + + return 1; } /* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */ @@ -1774,7 +1818,6 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) struct vcpu *v; struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt; struct segment_register seg; - uint64_t efer_validbits; /* Which vcpu is this? */ vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h); @@ -1805,9 +1848,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d, hvm_domain_context_t *h) return -EINVAL; } - efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA - | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE; - if ( !hvm_efer_valid(d, ctxt.msr_efer, efer_validbits) ) + if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, ctxt.msr_efer, MASK_EXTR(ctxt.cr0, X86_CR0_PG)) ) { printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad EFER %#" PRIx64 "\n", d->domain_id, ctxt.msr_efer); @@ -2947,12 +2988,10 @@ err: int hvm_set_efer(uint64_t value) { struct vcpu *v = current; - uint64_t efer_validbits; value &= ~EFER_LMA; - efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE; - if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v->domain, value, efer_validbits) ) + if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, value, -1) ) { gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Trying to set reserved bit in " "EFER: %#"PRIx64"\n", value); -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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