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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.6] x86/Intel: Mitigations for GPZ SP4 - Speculative Store Bypass
commit bfe8f3e884a5a96021ad5a5de244d713a660aeff
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue May 29 11:08:34 2018 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue May 29 11:08:34 2018 +0200
x86/Intel: Mitigations for GPZ SP4 - Speculative Store Bypass
To combat GPZ SP4 "Speculative Store Bypass", Intel have extended their
speculative sidechannel mitigations specification as follows:
* A feature bit to indicate that Speculative Store Bypass Disable is
supported.
* A new bit in MSR_SPEC_CTRL which, when set, disables memory
disambiguation
in the pipeline.
* A new bit in MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, which will be set in future hardware,
indicating that the hardware is not susceptible to Speculative Store
Bypass
sidechannels.
For contemporary processors, this interface will be implemented via a
microcode update.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
master commit: 9df52a25e0e95a0b9971aa2fc26c5c6a5cbdf4ef
master date: 2018-05-21 14:20:06 +0100
---
docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown | 12 +++++++-----
tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c | 1 +
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 ++-
xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 5 +++++
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 6 ++++--
xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 1 +
xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 2 ++
8 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
index e2f4ae35d5..3d54bafd3d 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.markdown
@@ -440,9 +440,10 @@ accounting for hardware capabilities as enumerated via
CPUID.
Currently accepted:
-The Speculation Control hardware features `ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb` are used by
-default if avaiable. They can be ignored, e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen
-won't use them itself, and won't offer them to guests.
+The Speculation Control hardware features `ibrsb`, `stibp`, `ibpb`, `ssbd` are
+used by default if available and applicable. They can be ignored,
+e.g. `no-ibrsb`, at which point Xen won't use them itself, and won't offer
+them to guests.
### cpuid\_mask\_cpu (AMD only)
> `= fam_0f_rev_c | fam_0f_rev_d | fam_0f_rev_e | fam_0f_rev_f | fam_0f_rev_g
> | fam_10_rev_b | fam_10_rev_c | fam_11_rev_b`
@@ -1424,7 +1425,7 @@ protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support
for guests to use.
respectively.
* `msr-sc=` offers control over Xen's support for manipulating MSR\_SPEC\_CTRL
on entry and exit. These blocks are necessary to virtualise support for
- guests and if disabled, guests will be unable to use IBRS/STIBP/etc.
+ guests and if disabled, guests will be unable to use IBRS/STIBP/SSBD/etc.
* `rsb=` offers control over whether to overwrite the Return Stack Buffer /
Return Address Stack on entry to Xen.
@@ -1446,7 +1447,8 @@ prediction barriers on vcpu context switches.
On hardware supporting SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable), the `ssbd=`
option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. On AMD
hardware, this is a global option applied at boot, and not virtualised for
-guest use.
+guest use. On Intel hardware, the feature is virtualised for guests,
+independently of Xen's choice of setting.
### sync\_console
> `= <boolean>`
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
index 17e9f0f549..6a28fec97f 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list
*cpuid, const char* str)
{"fpu", 0x00000001, NA, CPUID_REG_EDX, 0, 1},
{"ibrsb", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 26, 1},
{"stibp", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 27, 1},
+ {"ssbd", 0x00000007, 0, CPUID_REG_EDX, 31, 1},
{"topoext", 0x80000001, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 22, 1},
{"tbm", 0x80000001, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 21, 1},
{"nodeid", 0x80000001, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 19, 1},
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 67f75b9ff0..11839f3e80 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4625,7 +4625,8 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax,
unsigned int *ebx,
if ( count == 0 )
{
if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) )
- *edx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+ *edx &= ~(cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) |
+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD));
/*
* Override STIBP to match IBRS. Guests can safely use STIBP
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
index c3adee57cd..f3831e0575 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
@@ -135,6 +135,11 @@ static int __init parse_xen_cpuid(const char *s)
if ( !val )
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
}
+ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 )
+ {
+ if ( !val )
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ }
else
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index ae9f830b51..c88e759724 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -192,13 +192,15 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk,
uint64_t caps)
printk("Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
/* Hardware features which pertain to speculative mitigations. */
- printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBRS/IBPB" : "",
(_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) ? " STIBP" : "",
+ (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)) ? " SSBD" : "",
(e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ? " IBPB" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "",
(caps & ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "",
- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "");
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "",
+ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO" : "");
/* Compiled-in support which pertains to BTI mitigations. */
#ifdef CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK
@@ -206,13 +208,16 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk,
uint64_t caps)
#endif
/* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */
- printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s, Other:%s\n",
+ printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s, Other:%s\n",
thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" :
thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" :
thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" :
thunk == THUNK_JMP ? "JMP" : "?",
!use_spec_ctrl ? "No" :
(default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS) ? "IBRS+" : "IBRS-",
+ !use_spec_ctrl || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD)
+ ? "" :
+ (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-",
opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "");
/*
@@ -411,6 +416,10 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
}
}
+ /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) && use_spec_ctrl && opt_ssbd )
+ default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
/*
* PV guests can poison the RSB to any virtual address from which
* they can execute a call instruction. This is necessarily outside
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index 1e71c05b28..b759f9ef3b 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -880,7 +880,8 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
if ( regs->_ecx == 0 )
{
if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) )
- d &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+ d &= ~(cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) |
+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD));
/*
* Override STIBP to match IBRS. Guests can safely use STIBP
@@ -970,7 +971,8 @@ void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE));
if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) )
- d &= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB);
+ d &= cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) |
+ cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
else
d = 0;
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
index 22429db282..20c6d627dd 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_IBRSB (9*32+26) /* IBRS and IBPB support (used by
Intel) */
#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (9*32+27) /* STIBP */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS (9*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD (9*32+31) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */
/* An alias of a feature we know is always going to be present. */
#define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS X86_FEATURE_LM
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
index e5845a7871..c21801c1d1 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define MSR_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (_AC(1, ULL) << 2)
#define MSR_PRED_CMD 0x00000049
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@
#define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_RDCL_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 0)
#define ARCH_CAPABILITIES_IBRS_ALL (_AC(1, ULL) << 1)
#define ARCH_CAPS_RSBA (_AC(1, ULL) << 2)
+#define ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 4)
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.6
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