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[xen master] x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist



commit 2a4e6c4e4bea2e0bb720418c331ee28ff9c7632e
Author:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Nov 30 17:17:38 2018 +0000
Commit:     Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed Sep 8 14:16:19 2021 +0100

    x86/amd: Use newer SSBD mechanisms if they exist
    
    The opencoded legacy Memory Disambiguation logic in init_amd() neglected
    Fam19h for the Zen3 microarchitecture.  Further more, all Zen2 based system
    have the architectural MSR_SPEC_CTRL and the SSBD bit within it, so 
shouldn't
    be using MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG.
    
    Implement the algorithm given in AMD's SSBD whitepaper, and leave a
    printk_once() behind in the case that no controls can be found.
    
    This now means that a user explicitly choosing `spec-ctrl=ssbd` will 
properly
    turn off Memory Disambiguation on Fam19h/Zen3 systems.
    
    This still remains a single system-wide setting (for now), and is not 
context
    switched between vCPUs.  As such, it doesn't interact with Intel's use of
    MSR_SPEC_CTRL and default_xen_spec_ctrl (yet).
    
    Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c   | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h   |  1 +
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c | 10 +------
 xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c |  5 +++-
 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
index cb12861481..c4d84373a7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -681,6 +681,56 @@ void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
                          c->x86_capability);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Refer to the AMD Speculative Store Bypass whitepaper:
+ * 
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf
+ */
+void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+       int bit = -1;
+
+       if (cpu_has_ssb_no)
+               return;
+
+       if (cpu_has_amd_ssbd) {
+               wrmsrl(MSR_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       if (cpu_has_virt_ssbd) {
+               wrmsrl(MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, opt_ssbd ? SPEC_CTRL_SSBD : 0);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       switch (c->x86) {
+       case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+       case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+       case 0x17:
+       case 0x18: bit = 10; break;
+       }
+
+       if (bit >= 0) {
+               uint64_t val, mask = 1ull << bit;
+
+               if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
+                   ({
+                           val &= ~mask;
+                           if (opt_ssbd)
+                                   val |= mask;
+                           false;
+                   }) ||
+                   wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val) ||
+                   ({
+                           rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, val);
+                           (val & mask) != (opt_ssbd * mask);
+                   }))
+                       bit = -1;
+       }
+
+       if (bit < 0)
+               printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n");
+}
+
 void __init detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour(void)
 {
        uint64_t base;
@@ -744,30 +794,13 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
        else /* Implicily "== 0x10 || >= 0x12" by being 64bit. */
                amd_init_lfence(c);
 
+       amd_init_ssbd(c);
+
        /* Probe for NSCB on Zen2 CPUs when not virtualised */
        if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && !cpu_has_nscb && c == &boot_cpu_data &&
            c->x86 == 0x17)
                detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour();
 
-       /*
-        * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation
-        * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR.
-        */
-       if (opt_ssbd) {
-               int bit = -1;
-
-               switch (c->x86) {
-               case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
-               case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
-               case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
-               }
-
-               if (bit >= 0 && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) {
-                       value |= 1ull << bit;
-                       wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
-               }
-       }
-
        /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
        if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
                __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
index 0dd1b762ff..b593bd85f0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -21,4 +21,5 @@ extern bool detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 void amd_log_freq(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 void detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour(void);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
index d7a04af2bb..429d6601fc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -33,21 +33,13 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
        unsigned long long value;
 
        amd_init_lfence(c);
+       amd_init_ssbd(c);
 
        /* Probe for NSCB on Zen2 CPUs when not virtualised */
        if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && !cpu_has_nscb && c == &boot_cpu_data &&
            c->x86 == 0x18)
                detect_zen2_null_seg_behaviour();
 
-       /*
-        * If the user has explicitly chosen to disable Memory Disambiguation
-        * to mitigiate Speculative Store Bypass, poke the appropriate MSR.
-        */
-       if (opt_ssbd && !rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value)) {
-               value |= 1ull << 10;
-               wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
-       }
-
        /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
        if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch)
                __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index c310a7f6ac..f0c67d41b8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -326,20 +326,23 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, 
uint64_t caps)
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL)                       ? " IBRS_ALL"     
  : "",
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA)                           ? " RSBA"         
  : "",
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL)                     ? " SKIP_L1DFL"   
  : "",
+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSB_NO)) ||
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO)                         ? " SSB_NO"       
  : "",
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO)                         ? " MDS_NO"       
  : "",
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)                         ? " TAA_NO"       
  : "");
 
     /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */
-    printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+    printk("  Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
            (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) ||
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB))          ? " IBPB"         
  : "",
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB))          ? " IBRS"         
  : "",
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))          ? " STIBP"        
  : "",
+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ||
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))           ? " SSBD"         
  : "",
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_L1D_FLUSH))      ? " L1D_FLUSH"    
  : "",
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))       ? " MD_CLEAR"     
  : "",
            (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))     ? " SRBDS_CTRL"   
  : "",
+           (e8b  & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))      ? " VIRT_SSBD"    
  : "",
            (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL)                       ? " TSX_CTRL"     
  : "");
 
     /* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master



 


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