[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [xen master] x86/msr: Clean up the MSR_EFER constants
commit 00d0fcf33c580ba4577a9a2ac274863c173bbe65 Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri May 25 16:12:05 2018 +0100 Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Wed Sep 8 17:54:21 2021 +0100 x86/msr: Clean up the MSR_EFER constants There are no remaining users of the bit position constants. Move the used constants into the cleaned-up area of msr-index.h and apply appropriate style. Rename EFER_NX to EFER_NXE to match both the Intel and AMD specs. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c | 4 ++-- xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 4 ++-- xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++-- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 4 ++-- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 2 +- xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h | 30 +++++++++++------------------- 8 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S b/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S index 150f7f90a2..dd1bea0d10 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +++ b/xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S @@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ trampoline_setup: /* Check for NX. Adjust EFER setting if available. */ bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx jnc 1f - orb $EFER_NX >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) + orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) 1: /* Check for availability of long mode. */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c index abf8e206d7..9b011c3446 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c @@ -270,14 +270,14 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) if (disable) { wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable & ~disable); bootsym(trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; - bootsym(trampoline_efer) |= EFER_NX; + bootsym(trampoline_efer) |= EFER_NXE; } if (disable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID) printk(KERN_INFO "revised cpuid level: %d\n", cpuid_eax(0)); if (disable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE) { - write_efer(read_efer() | EFER_NX); + write_efer(read_efer() | EFER_NXE); printk(KERN_INFO "re-enabled NX (Execute Disable) protection\n"); } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h index fb217031ff..9b0cc29aae 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static void __init efi_arch_cpu(void) caps[cpufeat_word(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)] = cpuid_edx(0x80000001); if ( cpu_has_nx ) - trampoline_efer |= EFER_NX; + trampoline_efer |= EFER_NXE; } } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 5086773e5c..7b48a1b925 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -952,8 +952,8 @@ const char *hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value, if ( (value & EFER_LMA) && (!(value & EFER_LME) || !cr0_pg) ) return "LMA/LME/CR0.PG inconsistency"; - if ( (value & EFER_NX) && !p->extd.nx ) - return "NX without feature"; + if ( (value & EFER_NXE) && !p->extd.nx ) + return "NXE without feature"; if ( (value & EFER_SVME) && (!p->extd.svm || !nestedhvm_enabled(d)) ) return "SVME without nested virt"; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c index 8dc92c8b9f..309912a234 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c @@ -563,8 +563,8 @@ static void svm_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v) if ( paging_mode_shadow(v->domain) ) { /* EFER.NX is a Xen-owned bit and is not under guest control. */ - guest_efer &= ~EFER_NX; - guest_efer |= xen_efer & EFER_NX; + guest_efer &= ~EFER_NXE; + guest_efer |= xen_efer & EFER_NXE; /* * CR0.PG is a Xen-owned bit, and remains set even when the guest has diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c index e09b7e3af9..b0a42d05f8 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -1623,8 +1623,8 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_efer(struct vcpu *v) * When using shadow pagetables, EFER.NX is a Xen-owned bit and is not * under guest control. */ - guest_efer &= ~EFER_NX; - guest_efer |= xen_efer & EFER_NX; + guest_efer &= ~EFER_NXE; + guest_efer |= xen_efer & EFER_NXE; } if ( !vmx_unrestricted_guest(v) ) diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h index 4a8fb571de..7e842f2dc2 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int hvm_get_param(struct domain *d, uint32_t index, uint64_t *value); #define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \ (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMAP)) #define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \ - ((v)->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_NX) + ((v)->arch.hvm.guest_efer & EFER_NXE) #define hvm_pku_enabled(v) \ (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PKE)) diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h index 903923e5a5..3fe14b820c 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h @@ -119,6 +119,17 @@ #define PASID_PASID_MASK 0x000fffff #define PASID_VALID (_AC(1, ULL) << 31) +#define MSR_EFER 0xc0000080 /* Extended Feature Enable Register */ +#define EFER_SCE (_AC(1, ULL) << 0) /* SYSCALL Enable */ +#define EFER_LME (_AC(1, ULL) << 8) /* Long Mode Enable */ +#define EFER_LMA (_AC(1, ULL) << 10) /* Long Mode Active */ +#define EFER_NXE (_AC(1, ULL) << 11) /* No Execute Enable */ +#define EFER_SVME (_AC(1, ULL) << 12) /* Secure Virtual Machine Enable */ +#define EFER_FFXSE (_AC(1, ULL) << 14) /* Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */ + +#define EFER_KNOWN_MASK \ + (EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NXE | EFER_SVME | EFER_FFXSE) + #define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010 #define SYSCFG_MTRR_FIX_DRAM_EN (_AC(1, ULL) << 18) #define SYSCFG_MTRR_FIX_DRAM_MOD_EN (_AC(1, ULL) << 19) @@ -145,7 +156,6 @@ */ /* x86-64 specific MSRs */ -#define MSR_EFER 0xc0000080 /* extended feature register */ #define MSR_STAR 0xc0000081 /* legacy mode SYSCALL target */ #define MSR_LSTAR 0xc0000082 /* long mode SYSCALL target */ #define MSR_CSTAR 0xc0000083 /* compat mode SYSCALL target */ @@ -155,24 +165,6 @@ #define MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE 0xc0000102 /* SwapGS GS shadow */ #define MSR_TSC_AUX 0xc0000103 /* Auxiliary TSC */ -/* EFER bits: */ -#define _EFER_SCE 0 /* SYSCALL/SYSRET */ -#define _EFER_LME 8 /* Long mode enable */ -#define _EFER_LMA 10 /* Long mode active (read-only) */ -#define _EFER_NX 11 /* No execute enable */ -#define _EFER_SVME 12 /* AMD: SVM enable */ -#define _EFER_FFXSE 14 /* AMD: Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR enable */ - -#define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE) -#define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME) -#define EFER_LMA (1<<_EFER_LMA) -#define EFER_NX (1<<_EFER_NX) -#define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME) -#define EFER_FFXSE (1<<_EFER_FFXSE) - -#define EFER_KNOWN_MASK (EFER_SCE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA | EFER_NX | \ - EFER_SVME | EFER_FFXSE) - /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */ #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1 #define MSR_IA32_A_PERFCTR0 0x000004c1 -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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