[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel][Xense-devel][PATCH][XSM][1/4] Xen Security Modules Patch
This patch provides the basic XSM framework for x86_32/x86/64. It includes a dummy module that implements call/return for each security function. The hooks implemented by this patch provide a framework for security modules to interpose and complement the existing privileged hypercall operationsin xen as well as interpose on the discretionary operations between domains. I have done very casual performance testing of the XSM in comparison to native xen. The XSM (with or without the dummy module) has negligible impact as measured by lmbench and kbench from either dom0 or domU. The tests were conducted on xen running idle dom0's and idle domU's. The micro-benchmarks can/do especially vary when a security module (other than the dummy module) is in place. This is to be expected. The macro- benchmarks for a specific security module tend to average out the micro- benchmark variations but may not be representative of a real platform workload. The framework is configured as default-enable in this patch set. Configuration of XSM is made in Config.mk. The only configuration option is XSM_ENABLE = y/n. XSM_ENABLE must be y to compile an XSM module. XSM provides a generalized hook infrastructure allowing third-party security modules to interpose on the Xen code path. A default or dummy module provides basic call/return functionality for hooks not implemented by a given module. During module initialization, a module registers its security hooks and the equivalent dummy hooks are unregistered. If a module does not implement a hook, the equivalent dummy hook remains in place. Modules also may define and register at boot time a module specific hypercall through the XSM hook infrastructure. Modules may also define at Xen compile time a magic number XSM_MAGIC to indicate that a policy should be discovered from the images loaded at boot. The policy file should then be listed in grub as one of the multi-boot modules after the dom0 kernel. Signed-off-by: George Coker <gscoker@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Attachment:
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