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RE: [Xen-devel] vmx & efer


  • To: "Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@xxxxxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 4 May 2007 09:44:17 -0700
  • Delivery-date: Fri, 04 May 2007 09:42:50 -0700
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>
  • Thread-index: AceOYsK4qpb5yQbxS1iowqqxkbGU6QAAatCQ
  • Thread-topic: [Xen-devel] vmx & efer

Jan Beulich wrote:
> Am I blind in that I cannot find the place where the guest intended
> EFER value gets loaded into the CPU register? The VMCS has no field
> for this (other than AMD's VMCB), and the guest_msr_state->flags bit
> for this register doesn't get set anywhere. I'm implying that the
> guest thus always runs with all features enabled that were enabled by
> the hypervisor (slight security issue, as EFER.SCE set implies LSTAR
> was initialized, which may not be true). 

The bit LMA and LME are automaticaly are loaded by the hardware. Please
look at the spec (Volume 3B). For SCE, we discussed a while ago, but can
you please elaborate on the security issues?

> 
> Further I am quite confused about the saving and restoring of CSTAR -
> all parts of the SDM state or imply that this register doesn't exist
> (as syscall is supposedly invalid in compatibility mode), so it
> wouldn't need saving/restoring at all; there's one exception though:
> section 25.10.4.3 says "SYSCALL/SYSRET invocations can occur from
> either 32-bit compatibility mode application code or from 64-bit
> application code." 

I agree that it's slightly confusing, but the previous sentence says
"They are available only in 64-bit mode and only when the SCE bit of the
IA32_EFER MSR is set." 

The reason we save/restore CSTAR is that x86-64 Linux (still) writes to
it  because it did exist before. But I think we can stop doing that.

> 
> Thanks, Jan
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

Jun
---
Intel Open Source Technology Center

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