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Re: [Xen-devel] Re: Next steps with pv_ops for Xen

>> It breaks with:
>> Intel machine check architecture supported.
>> (XEN) traps.c:1734:d0 Domain attempted WRMSR 00000404 from 00000000:00000001 
>> to
>> ffffffff:ffffffff.
>> Intel machine check reporting enabled on CPU#0.
>> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
>> Modules linked in:
>Hm.  Looks like Xen is getting upset about dom0 trying to disable
>caching.  No, wait: 0xffffffff:ffffffff?  That's strange; I wonder if
>its just misreporting the value, because the code doesn't look like its
>trying to write that.
>Either way, the fix is to implement xen_write_cr0, and mask off any bits
>that Xen won't want us to set/clear (or if it doesn't allow dom0 to
>change cr0, just ignore all updates).

Why do you think that's a CR0 write? The messages clearly indicate an
MSR write, and these writes are clearly visible in intel_p{4,6}_mcheck_init()
and amd_mcheck_init(). The question is why intel_p4_mcheck_init() doesn't
check CPUID bits before trying to touch any registers... (And similarly
amd_mcheck_init() is checking only the MCE bit, not the MCA one.)

But then I just noticed that Xen itself doesn't clear the MCE/MCA bits either
in emulate_forced_invalid_op(), apparently under the assumption that PV
guests wouldn't try to make use of this feature.

A simple workaround would be to force mce_disabled to 1 in early Xen


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