[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][RFC] Support more Capability Structures andDevice Specific
Dong, Eddie writes ("RE: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][RFC] Support more Capability Structures andDevice Specific"): > Per current data, pass through get many known bug fixed as the case > Dexuan mentioned. But we didn't see a HW damaging host. Some know issue > could be a device issuing tons of PCIe traffic, absorbing extra power, > issuing interrupt storm etc, but right now we didn't see issues yet. Most people doing PCI passthrough appear to be under the impression that the guest cannot escape and cannot damage the host. (Even those currently doing PCI passthrough with current production hardware without an iommu!) I think it is fine to have a passthrough option which doesn't properly protect the host from the guest - this is a useful setup in many situations. But it should not be enabled by default, surely ? Note that this is a _security_ problem. So `data' about `issues' which you have `seen' is irrelevant. Just because you haven't actually observed any misbehaviour with non-malicious guests doesn't mean that a malicious guest couldn't cause the hardware to melt. Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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