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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] HVM guests are allowed to use the entire virtual address space for



Put another way, I'd rather ASSERT(!is_hvm_vcpu(current)) than further
reinforce the current confusion around these macros by supporting an
obsolete usage.

 -- Keir

On 25/05/2010 16:04, "Keir Fraser" <keir.fraser@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> I think this is already handled correctly by guest_access.h, which is what
> really matters. Nowadays copy_{to,from}_user (but not __copy_{to,from}_user)
> are mainly for private usage only by the guest-access macros, and just a few
> other arch-dependent PV_specific bits of code. Of course the __ versions are
> still generally useful as 'copy but catch any fault' functions.
> 
>  -- Keir
> 
> On 25/05/2010 15:49, "Tim Deegan" <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
>> whatever they want, without any Xen hole.  __addr_ok() is therefore
>> always true for such guests.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> 
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