Re: [Xen-devel] upstream merge status for 2.6.35, .36?

[Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>]

> > swiotlb seems to be in linux-next now.. Congratulations!

Wheew, it took more than time than I anticipated, but yes!. Thank you.
> 
> Yes, http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/5/71
> 
> Now that looks exceedingly smooth, but if you look at the date on
> http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/5/11/223 ... on the bright side, the new swiotlb

So the SWIOTLB is 1 out 3. The next component is:

2). Xen SWIOTLB. This is the xen swiotlb code that utilizes the swiotlb
proper that was just made generic enough to be used in this capacity.
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/swiotlb-2.6.git 
xen-swiotlb-0.8.2

3). and then the Xen PCI front. Which utilizes the Xen-SWIOTLB (and also
the Xen PCI), to well, allow guests to have PCI devices passed in.

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git pv/pcifront-2.6.34

The 2) and 3) are mostly Xen specific so they should be much more palpable
than the first one.

> branch is both peer-reviewed and user-tested in xen/stable-2.6.32.x AFAICT,

Kind of. The pcifront-2.6.34 is definitly in xen/stable-2.6.32.x. The
SWIOTLB + Xen-SWIOTLB system in 2.6.32 is uhh, swiotlb-0.3 or so I
think. So the earlier ideas on how to make it work - but I have to
stress the majority of the changes between 0.3 and 0.8.3 is in the
facade - the underlaying code that does the translation has been
unchanged. And _all_ of the bugs in translation have been fixed (we had
a nasty one at the beginning that fortunatly is fixed).

Also some wild adventerous folks have been taking the 
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/konrad/xen.git pv/merge.2.6.3[x]

where X: 32,33,34 and testing it - which has all of those patches
(SWIOTLB 0.8.3  + Xen SWIOTLB 0.8 + Xen PCI Front 2.6.34) integrated in.

Which reminds me, I need to rebase those once more and annonce it to
xen-devel to see if anybody is interested in running them and having
their name enshrined as 'Tested-by: XX' in the git commits.

> so the end-result should be bulletproof (as much as it can be :).

There are some outstanding issues that we know of. I hadn't yet gotten
my head around them, but here is a list of Xen PCI frontend bugs:

1). Pass in 4GB or more to DomU. All the memory that the guest sees are
RAM and there are no "holes" for the PCI devices, akin to what you have
on a normal machine (the hole is 256MB and it shifts 256MB of RAM above
the 4GB - we don't do that yet in DomU). Workaround: use less memory, or
some magic Linux kernel parameter (memhole?) to create a hole.

Xen PCI backend: 

1) if you have CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled.
There is a bug in how the XenPCI Back driver interacts with the XenBus
that triggers a lockdependecy warning. It is a problem that hasn't been
addressed yet, but it should not affect everyday usage of PCI cards.

2). xl toolstack is still experimental. Jeremy has been taking a crack
at it and fixed a lot of the issues, but I haven't seen a green light
from him - so to be on a safe side you might want to use 'xm' stack.

3) Unclean shutdown of DomU with MSI devices. If you kill the guest
outright without making it unload the drivers the PCI device, if it
uses MSI/MSI-X, might suddenly start sending an IRQ storm. I haven't
tracked this down yet.

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