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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 02/16] vmx: nest: wrapper for control update
On Wednesday 08 September 2010 17:22:10 Qing He wrote:
> In nested virtualization, the L0 controls may not be the same
> with controls in physical VMCS.
> Explict maintain guest controls in variables and use wrappers
> for control update, do not rely on physical control value.
>
> Signed-off-by: Qing He <qing.he@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx>
Acked-By: Christoph Egger <Christoph.Egger@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> diff -r 905ca9cc0596 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c Wed Aug 04 16:30:40 2010 +0800
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c Thu Aug 05 15:32:24 2010 +0800
> @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
> if ( !(*cpu_exec_control & ctl) )
> {
> *cpu_exec_control |= ctl;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, *cpu_exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
> if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step) )
> {
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control); + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> return;
> }
>
> diff -r 905ca9cc0596 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c Wed Aug 04 16:30:40 2010 +0800
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c Thu Aug 05 15:32:24 2010 +0800
> @@ -839,10 +839,10 @@
> __vmwrite(VMCS_LINK_POINTER_HIGH, ~0UL);
> #endif
>
> - __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP,
> - HVM_TRAP_MASK
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap = HVM_TRAP_MASK
>
> | (paging_mode_hap(d) ? 0 : (1U << TRAP_page_fault))
>
> - | (1U << TRAP_no_device));
> + | (1U << TRAP_no_device);
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
>
> v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[0] = X86_CR0_PE | X86_CR0_ET;
> hvm_update_guest_cr(v, 0);
> diff -r 905ca9cc0596 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c Wed Aug 04 16:30:40 2010 +0800
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c Thu Aug 05 15:32:24 2010 +0800
> @@ -385,6 +385,22 @@
>
> #endif /* __i386__ */
>
> +void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v)
> +{
> + __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> +}
> +
> +void vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu *v)
> +{
> + __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control);
> +}
> +
> +void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
> +{
> + __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap);
> +}
> +
> static int vmx_guest_x86_mode(struct vcpu *v)
> {
> unsigned int cs_ar_bytes;
> @@ -408,7 +424,7 @@
> /* Clear the DR dirty flag and re-enable intercepts for DR accesses.
> */ v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty = 0;
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
>
> v->arch.guest_context.debugreg[0] = read_debugreg(0);
> v->arch.guest_context.debugreg[1] = read_debugreg(1);
> @@ -622,7 +638,8 @@
> static void vmx_fpu_enter(struct vcpu *v)
> {
> setup_fpu(v);
> - __vm_clear_bit(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, TRAP_no_device);
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap &= ~(1u << TRAP_no_device);
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.host_cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_TS;
> __vmwrite(HOST_CR0, v->arch.hvm_vmx.host_cr0);
> }
> @@ -648,7 +665,8 @@
> {
> v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0] |= X86_CR0_TS;
> __vmwrite(GUEST_CR0, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[0]);
> - __vm_set_bit(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, TRAP_no_device);
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap |= (1u << TRAP_no_device);
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
> }
> }
>
> @@ -954,7 +972,7 @@
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING;
> if ( enable )
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
> }
>
> @@ -1047,7 +1065,7 @@
>
> void vmx_update_debug_state(struct vcpu *v)
> {
> - unsigned long intercepts, mask;
> + unsigned long mask;
>
> ASSERT(v == current);
>
> @@ -1055,12 +1073,11 @@
> if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
> mask |= 1u << TRAP_debug;
>
> - intercepts = __vmread(EXCEPTION_BITMAP);
> if ( v->arch.hvm_vcpu.debug_state_latch )
> - intercepts |= mask;
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap |= mask;
> else
> - intercepts &= ~mask;
> - __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, intercepts);
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap &= ~mask;
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
> }
>
> static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr)
> @@ -1087,7 +1104,7 @@
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~cr3_ctls;
> if ( !hvm_paging_enabled(v) )
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= cr3_ctls;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control); + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
>
> /* Changing CR0.PE can change some bits in real CR4. */
> vmx_update_guest_cr(v, 4);
> @@ -1122,7 +1139,8 @@
> vmx_set_segment_register(v, s, ®[s]);
> v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] |= X86_CR4_VME;
> __vmwrite(GUEST_CR4, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4]);
> - __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, 0xffffffff);
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap = 0xffffffff;
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
> }
> else
> {
> @@ -1134,11 +1152,11 @@
> ((v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4] & ~X86_CR4_VME)
>
> |(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_VME));
>
> __vmwrite(GUEST_CR4, v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4]);
> - __vmwrite(EXCEPTION_BITMAP,
> - HVM_TRAP_MASK
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.exception_bitmap = HVM_TRAP_MASK
>
> | (paging_mode_hap(v->domain) ?
>
> 0 : (1U << TRAP_page_fault))
> - | (1U << TRAP_no_device));
> + | (1U << TRAP_no_device);
> + vmx_update_exception_bitmap(v);
> vmx_update_debug_state(v);
> }
> }
> @@ -1544,7 +1562,7 @@
>
> /* Allow guest direct access to DR registers */
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> }
>
> static void vmx_invlpg_intercept(unsigned long vaddr)
> @@ -1928,18 +1946,18 @@
> void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v)
> {
> struct vlapic *vlapic = vcpu_vlapic(v);
> - uint32_t ctl;
>
> if ( !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
> return;
>
> vmx_vmcs_enter(v);
> - ctl = __vmread(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
> - ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control
> + &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
> if ( !vlapic_hw_disabled(vlapic) &&
> (vlapic_base_address(vlapic) == APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE) )
> - ctl |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
> - __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, ctl);
> + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control
> + |= SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
> + vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(v);
> vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
> }
>
> @@ -2469,14 +2487,12 @@
> case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_VIRT_INTR:
> /* Disable the interrupt window. */
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> - v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> break;
> case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_VIRT_NMI:
> /* Disable the NMI window. */
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> - v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
> + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> break;
> case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH: {
> const enum hvm_task_switch_reason reasons[] = {
> @@ -2627,7 +2643,7 @@
>
> case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
> - __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control); + vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
> if ( v->domain->debugger_attached && v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step
> ) domain_pause_for_debugger();
> break;
> @@ -2677,16 +2693,14 @@
> /* VPID was disabled: now enabled. */
> curr->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |=
> SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
> - __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> - curr->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control);
> + vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(curr);
> }
> else if ( old_asid && !new_asid )
> {
> /* VPID was enabled: now disabled. */
> curr->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &=
> ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
> - __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
> - curr->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control);
> + vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(curr);
> }
> }
>
> diff -r 905ca9cc0596 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h Wed Aug 04 16:30:40 2010
> +0800 +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h Thu Aug 05 15:32:24
> 2010 +0800 @@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
> /* Cache of cpu execution control. */
> u32 exec_control;
> u32 secondary_exec_control;
> + u32 exception_bitmap;
>
> #ifdef __x86_64__
> struct vmx_msr_state msr_state;
> diff -r 905ca9cc0596 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h Wed Aug 04 16:30:40 2010 +0800
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h Thu Aug 05 15:32:24 2010 +0800
> @@ -60,6 +60,9 @@
> void vmx_vlapic_msr_changed(struct vcpu *v);
> void vmx_realmode(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
> void vmx_update_debug_state(struct vcpu *v);
> +void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v);
> +void vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu *v);
> +void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v);
>
> /*
> * Exit Reasons
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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