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[Xen-devel] wrapper of CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL



Rebased cleanup base on previous QIng's nested patch series.
Thx, Eddie


Unifying the CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL VMCS field write into a single place for
additional control that is required in nested VMX.

Signed-off-by: Qing He <qing.he@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@xxxxxxxxx>

diff -r b7c16de20715 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c       Mon Sep 13 11:00:30 2010 +0800
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/intr.c       Mon Sep 13 11:00:43 2010 +0800
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@
 
 static void enable_intr_window(struct vcpu *v, struct hvm_intack intack)
 {
-    u32 *cpu_exec_control = &v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control;
     u32 ctl = CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING;
 
     ASSERT(intack.source != hvm_intsrc_none);
@@ -103,10 +102,10 @@ static void enable_intr_window(struct vc
         ctl = CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
     }
 
-    if ( !(*cpu_exec_control & ctl) )
+    if ( !(v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control & ctl) )
     {
-        *cpu_exec_control |= ctl;
-        __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, *cpu_exec_control);
+        v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= ctl;
+        vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
     }
 }
 
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ asmlinkage void vmx_intr_assist(void)
     if ( unlikely(v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step) )
     {
         v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
-        __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+        vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
         return;
     }
 
diff -r b7c16de20715 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c       Mon Sep 13 11:00:30 2010 +0800
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c       Mon Sep 13 11:00:43 2010 +0800
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v
     /* Do not enable Monitor Trap Flag unless start single step debug */
     v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
 
-    __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+    vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
     __vmwrite(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vmexit_ctl);
     __vmwrite(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, vmentry_ctl);
 
diff -r b7c16de20715 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c        Mon Sep 13 11:00:30 2010 +0800
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c        Mon Sep 13 11:01:26 2010 +0800
@@ -385,6 +385,11 @@ long_mode_do_msr_write(unsigned int msr,
 
 #endif /* __i386__ */
 
+void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v)
+{
+    __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+}
+
 static void vmx_update_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu *v)
 {
     __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
@@ -419,7 +424,7 @@ static void vmx_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
     /* Clear the DR dirty flag and re-enable intercepts for DR accesses. */
     v->arch.hvm_vcpu.flag_dr_dirty = 0;
     v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
-    __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+    vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
 
     v->arch.guest_context.debugreg[0] = read_debugreg(0);
     v->arch.guest_context.debugreg[1] = read_debugreg(1);
@@ -968,7 +973,7 @@ static void vmx_set_rdtsc_exiting(struct
     v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING;
     if ( enable )
         v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING;
-    __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+    vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
     vmx_vmcs_exit(v);
 }
 
@@ -1101,7 +1106,7 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct v
             v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~cr3_ctls;
             if ( !hvm_paging_enabled(v) )
                 v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control |= cr3_ctls;
-            __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+            vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
 
             /* Changing CR0.PE can change some bits in real CR4. */
             vmx_update_guest_cr(v, 4);
@@ -1559,7 +1564,7 @@ static void vmx_dr_access(unsigned long 
 
     /* Allow guest direct access to DR registers */
     v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
-    __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+    vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
 }
 
 static void vmx_invlpg_intercept(unsigned long vaddr)
@@ -2481,14 +2486,12 @@ asmlinkage void vmx_vmexit_handler(struc
     case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_VIRT_INTR:
         /* Disable the interrupt window. */
         v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING;
-        __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
-                  v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+        vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
         break;
     case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_VIRT_NMI:
         /* Disable the NMI window. */
         v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
-        __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
-                  v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+        vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
         break;
     case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH: {
         const enum hvm_task_switch_reason reasons[] = {
@@ -2639,7 +2642,7 @@ asmlinkage void vmx_vmexit_handler(struc
 
     case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
         v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG;
-        __vmwrite(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control);
+        vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(v);
         if ( v->domain->debugger_attached && v->arch.hvm_vcpu.single_step )
             domain_pause_for_debugger();
         break;
diff -r b7c16de20715 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h Mon Sep 13 11:00:30 2010 +0800
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.h Mon Sep 13 11:00:43 2010 +0800
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ void vmx_realmode(struct cpu_user_regs *
 void vmx_realmode(struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
 void vmx_update_debug_state(struct vcpu *v);
 void vmx_update_exception_bitmap(struct vcpu *v);
+void vmx_update_cpu_exec_control(struct vcpu *v);
 
 
 /*

Attachment: exec_control.patch
Description: exec_control.patch

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