[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH] fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference - CVE-2009-3547
We've been applying this patch since the fix was discovered but i just realized yesterday when building a new kernel that the Xen kernel does not have this fix applied yet. I also have verified that this exploit works to gain root access on the current http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6.18-xen.hg branch -- Shaun Retian Chief Technical Officer Network Data Center Host, Inc. http://www.ndchost.com -- PATCH -- From ad3960243e55320d74195fb85c975e0a8cc4466c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Earl Chew <earl_chew@xxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 15:55:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] fs: pipe.c null pointer dereference This patch fixes a null pointer exception in pipe_rdwr_open() which generates the stack trace: > Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028 RIP: > [<ffffffff802899a5>] pipe_rdwr_open+0x35/0x70 > [<ffffffff8028125c>] __dentry_open+0x13c/0x230 > [<ffffffff8028143d>] do_filp_open+0x2d/0x40 > [<ffffffff802814aa>] do_sys_open+0x5a/0x100 > [<ffffffff8021faf3>] sysenter_do_call+0x1b/0x67 The failure mode is triggered by an attempt to open an anonymous pipe via /proc/pid/fd/* as exemplified by this script: ============================================================= while : ; do { echo y ; sleep 1 ; } | { while read ; do echo z$REPLY; done ; } & PID=$! OUT=$(ps -efl | grep 'sleep 1' | grep -v grep | { read PID REST ; echo $PID; } ) OUT="${OUT%% *}" DELAY=$((RANDOM * 1000 / 32768)) usleep $((DELAY * 1000 + RANDOM % 1000 )) echo n > /proc/$OUT/fd/1 # Trigger defect done ============================================================= Note that the failure window is quite small and I could only reliably reproduce the defect by inserting a small delay in pipe_rdwr_open(). For example: static int pipe_rdwr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { msleep(100); mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); Although the defect was observed in pipe_rdwr_open(), I think it makes sense to replicate the change through all the pipe_*_open() functions. The core of the change is to verify that inode->i_pipe has not been released before attempting to manipulate it. If inode->i_pipe is no longer present, return ENOENT to indicate so. The comment about potentially using atomic_t for i_pipe->readers and i_pipe->writers has also been removed because it is no longer relevant in this context. The inode->i_mutex lock must be used so that inode->i_pipe can be dealt with correctly. Signed-off-by: Earl Chew <earl_chew@xxxxxxxxxxx> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxx Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> --- fs/pipe.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c index 52c4151..ae17d02 100644 --- a/fs/pipe.c +++ b/fs/pipe.c@@ -777,36 +777,55 @@ pipe_rdwr_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) static int pipe_read_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - /* We could have perhaps used atomic_t, but this and friends - below are the only places. So it doesn't seem worthwhile. */ + int ret = -ENOENT; + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); - inode->i_pipe->readers++; + + if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret = 0; + inode->i_pipe->readers++; + } + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); - return 0; + return ret; } static int pipe_write_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + int ret = -ENOENT; + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); - inode->i_pipe->writers++; + + if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret = 0; + inode->i_pipe->writers++; + } + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); - return 0; + return ret; } static int pipe_rdwr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + int ret = -ENOENT; + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); - if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ) - inode->i_pipe->readers++; - if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) - inode->i_pipe->writers++; + + if (inode->i_pipe) { + ret = 0; + if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_READ) + inode->i_pipe->readers++; + if (filp->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + inode->i_pipe->writers++; + } + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); - return 0; + return ret; } /* -- 1.7.3.2 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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