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[Xen-devel] [PATCH 0 of 5] mem_access: introduction of per-page access controls


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Joe Epstein <jepstein@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2010 23:27:12 -0800
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 28 Dec 2010 23:28:39 -0800
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>

This patch series introduces the notion of memory access permissions per
page, overlaid (or rather, laid underneath) the memory types, for independent
control and memory event handling of faults based on the page types.

Access permission violations are set to the memory event handler for
resolution.

The permissions provide independent read, write, and execute permissions,
and are currently only implemented for Intel EPT.

Descriptions:
1: Sends memory access page faults in HVM to the memory event interface
2: Establishes the p2m interface changes to accommodate access permissions
3: Domain creation can require an access handler
4: EPT and interface changes
5: libxc changes for the new memory events and HVM operations

Thanks

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