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[Xen-devel] [PATCH 0 of 6] REDO: mem_access & mem_access 2: memory access permissions


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Joe Epstein <jepstein98@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2011 14:07:04 -0800
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 04 Jan 2011 14:08:30 -0800
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  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xensource.com>

Apologies everyone for resending, but as requested, here is the
entirety of the mem_access (both original and addition 2), sorted into
patches that independently compile and proceed sequentially as
features are added.  I hope everyone finds the patches more readable.
Please make sure you apply the patches sequentially in the order
given.  Or, you may want to simply apply the one rollup patch attached
to this email.

The purpose of mem_access is to add memory access privileges to pages
that can be set and handled from dom0.  These privileges are somewhat
orthogonal to the existing page types mechanism, as page types have to
handle MMIO, demand paging, and page sharing, whereas the access flags
are pure permission checks.  There are a couple of HVMOPs added to
support this from dom0, as well as the necessary changes to libxc.
This is designed to be a generic interface, and a dom0 memory event
listener has broad abilities to set and handle permissions.

The feature is currently only implemented for HVM using EPTs on VMX,
though it can be added elsewhere in essentially the same manner.

This patch series (either the rollup here or the associated patches
1-6) supercedes all previous patches for mem_access and mem_access 2,
sent from late December until now.

If you find it useful, please let me know.  And as always, comments,
questions, and critiques are always welcome.

Thanks

Signed-off-by: Joe Epstein <jepstein@xxxxxxxxx>

Attachment: rollup.patch
Description: Binary data

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