[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI
>>> On 13.05.11 at 13:20, Joanna Rutkowska <joanna@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>> wrote: > On 05/13/11 13:11, Ian Campbell wrote: >> On Fri, 2011-05-13 at 12:08 +0100, Joanna Rutkowska wrote: >>> On 05/13/11 10:08, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>>> Finally, wouldn't killing all guests that potentially could have caused >>>> the problem be a better measure than bringing down the host? >>>> >>> >>> Killing the guest might no longer be enough, because the guest might >>> have already programmed the device to keep sending malicious MSIs. >> >> Is it even possible to know which guest triggered the MSI, or is the >> best you can do the set of all guests with an MSI capable device passed >> through? >> > > Ah, probably you're right -- if we have more than one driver domain, > then I think LAPIC would not tell us which device genrated the MSI. That's why I wrote "killing all guests that potentially could have ...". > In fact it's not really correct to assume that it must have been a guest > with a "MSI capable device" -- note that we don't trigger the MSI via > the official MSI triggering mechanism. You lost me here. Neither am I clear about what "non-official" triggering mechanism we use, nor can I see how a guest without any MSI-capable device would be able to trigger the problem. And even if things are as you say, it would still seem better to kill all guests with *any* passed through device, than bring down the entire host (there could e.g. be dozens of innocent pv guests and only a single hvm one that has a problematic device assigned). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |