[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI
At 18:19 +0100 on 20 May (1305915548), Ian Jackson wrote: > Tim Deegan writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] Xen security advisory CVE-2011-1898 - > VT-d (PCI passthrough) MSI"): > > At 21:48 +0100 on 19 May (1305841716), Cihula, Joseph wrote: > > > So how would the user (or installation SW) specify to use the best > > > (IOMMU) security available on the platform? > > > > iommu=on. That pretty much lines up with the current meaining. > > > > Only iommu=force requires a fully secure IOMMU, and you can > > overide that with iommu=force,nointremap. > > I think this is the best behaviour. Do we have a patch that > implements it ? If I'm not confused, the patch further upthread > crashes on lack of intremap even with iommu=on. AIUI Ian Campbell's most recent patch does exactly this. Ian? Tim. -- Tim Deegan <Tim.Deegan@xxxxxxxxxx> Principal Software Engineer, Xen Platform Team Citrix Systems UK Ltd. (Company #02937203, SL9 0BG) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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