[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] xen/x86: replace order-based range checking of M2P table by linear one
On 08/16/2011 07:07 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: > The order-based approach is not only less efficient (requiring a shift > and a compare, typical generated code looking like this > > mov eax, [machine_to_phys_order] > mov ecx, eax > shr ebx, cl > test ebx, ebx > jnz ... > > whereas a direct check requires just a compare, like in > > cmp ebx, [machine_to_phys_nr] > jae ... > > ), but also slightly dangerous in the 32-on-64 case - the element > address calculation can wrap if the next power of two boundary is > sufficiently far away from the actual upper limit of the table, and > hence can result in user space addresses being accessed (with it being > unknown what may actually be mapped there). > > Additionally, the elimination of the mistaken use of fls() here (should > have been __fls()) fixes a latent issue on x86-64 that would trigger > if the code was run on a system with memory extending beyond the 44-bit > boundary. I never really understood the rationale for the order stuff; I copied it across from 2.6.18-xen without really thinking about it. This looks sensible. But... > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/xen/page.h | 4 ++-- > arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 4 ++-- > arch/x86/xen/mmu.c | 12 ++++++++---- > 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > --- 3.1-rc2/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/page.h > +++ 3.1-rc2-x86-xen-p2m-nr/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/page.h > @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ typedef struct xpaddr { > ((unsigned long)((u64)CONFIG_XEN_MAX_DOMAIN_MEMORY * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 > / PAGE_SIZE)) > > extern unsigned long *machine_to_phys_mapping; > -extern unsigned int machine_to_phys_order; > +extern unsigned long machine_to_phys_nr; > > extern unsigned long get_phys_to_machine(unsigned long pfn); > extern bool set_phys_to_machine(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long mfn); > @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mfn_to_pfn(u > if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap)) > return mfn; > > - if (unlikely((mfn >> machine_to_phys_order) != 0)) { > + if (unlikely(mfn >= machine_to_phys_nr)) { > pfn = ~0; > goto try_override; > } > --- 3.1-rc2/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c > +++ 3.1-rc2-x86-xen-p2m-nr/arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c > @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_domain_type); > > unsigned long *machine_to_phys_mapping = (void *)MACH2PHYS_VIRT_START; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(machine_to_phys_mapping); > -unsigned int machine_to_phys_order; > -EXPORT_SYMBOL(machine_to_phys_order); > +unsigned long machine_to_phys_nr; > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(machine_to_phys_nr); > > struct start_info *xen_start_info; > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_start_info); > --- 3.1-rc2/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c > +++ 3.1-rc2-x86-xen-p2m-nr/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c > @@ -1713,15 +1713,19 @@ static void __init xen_map_identity_earl > void __init xen_setup_machphys_mapping(void) > { > struct xen_machphys_mapping mapping; > - unsigned long machine_to_phys_nr_ents; > > if (HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_machphys_mapping, &mapping) == 0) { > machine_to_phys_mapping = (unsigned long *)mapping.v_start; > - machine_to_phys_nr_ents = mapping.max_mfn + 1; > + machine_to_phys_nr = mapping.max_mfn + 1; > } else { > - machine_to_phys_nr_ents = MACH2PHYS_NR_ENTRIES; > + machine_to_phys_nr = MACH2PHYS_NR_ENTRIES; > } > - machine_to_phys_order = fls(machine_to_phys_nr_ents - 1); > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 > + if (machine_to_phys_mapping + machine_to_phys_nr > + < machine_to_phys_mapping) I'd prefer extra parens around the + just to make it very clear. Is this kind of overflow check fully defined, or could the compiler find some way of screwing it up? > + machine_to_phys_nr = (unsigned long *)NULL > + - machine_to_phys_mapping; Is the machine_to_phys_mapping array guaranteed to end at the end of the address space? And I think a literal '0' there would make it a bit clearer what's going on, rather than invoking all the stuff that NULL implies. Thanks, J _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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