Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 06/25] libelf-loader: introduce elf_load_image

["Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx>]

>>> On 09.12.11 at 14:13, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Implement a new function, called elf_load_image, to perform the actually
> copy of the elf image and clearing the padding.
> The function is implemented as memcpy and memset when the library is
> built as part of the tools, but it is implemented as copy_to_user and
> clear_user when built as part of Xen, so that it can be safely called
> with an HVM style dom0.

I meant to ask this on the first round already, but apparently forgot:
What is it that prevents memcpy()/memset() from being used for a
HVM style Dom0? {clear,copy_to}_user() still expect the guest memory
to be visible in the hypervisor's virtual address space - how could a
fault happen here? And if you have to take precautions for a fault,
shouldn't the calling code check the respective return values?

Jan


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