[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks
On 09/11/2012 04:09 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 10.09.12 at 23:10, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 09/10/2012 04:51 PM, Keir Fraser wrote: >>> On 10/09/2012 20:48, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> >>>> Overall, this series should not change the behavior of Xen when XSM is >>>> not enabled; however, in some cases, the exact errors that are returned >>>> will be different because security checks have been moved below validity >>>> checks. Also, once applied, newly introduced domctls and sysctls will >>>> not automatically be guarded by IS_PRIV checks - they will need to add >>>> their own permission checking code. >>> >>> How do we guard against accidentally forgetting to do this? >> >> The same way you guard against it when adding a new hypercall: when adding >> new functionality that needs access checks, also add the access checks. > > Except that previously the access check was done centrally at the > top of do_domctl(), so newly added sub-functions didn't need to > worry. > > Jan > One addition I am considering is an extra XSM hook at the start of do_domctl and do_sysctl that takes only the command (and domain, for domctl); this could be used to restrict access to unknown domctl/sysctls, and would fix the issues of adding sub-functions without access checks. -- Daniel De Graaf National Security Agency _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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