[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 12/20] xen: avoid calling rcu_lock_*target_domain when an XSM hook exists
On 09/11/2012 03:36 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 10.09.12 at 21:49, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> --- a/xen/common/grant_table.c >> +++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c >> @@ -195,30 +195,6 @@ double_gt_unlock(struct grant_table *lgt, struct >> grant_table *rgt) >> spin_unlock(&rgt->lock); >> } >> >> -static struct domain *gt_lock_target_domain_by_id(domid_t dom) >> -{ >> - struct domain *d; >> - int rc = GNTST_general_error; >> - >> - switch ( rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(dom, &d) ) >> - { >> - case 0: >> - return d; >> - >> - case -ESRCH: >> - gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", dom); >> - rc = GNTST_bad_domain; >> - break; >> - >> - case -EPERM: >> - rc = GNTST_permission_denied; >> - break; >> - } >> - >> - ASSERT(rc < 0 && -rc <= MAX_ERRNO); >> - return ERR_PTR(rc); >> -} >> - > > Removing that function again is fine as long as you retain the > distinguished error codes, which ... > >> static inline int >> __get_maptrack_handle( >> struct grant_table *t) >> @@ -1304,11 +1280,12 @@ gnttab_setup_table( >> goto out1; >> } >> >> - d = gt_lock_target_domain_by_id(op.dom); >> - if ( IS_ERR(d) ) >> + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(op.dom); >> + if ( d == NULL ) >> { >> - op.status = PTR_ERR(d); >> - goto out1; >> + gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", op.dom); >> + op.status = GNTST_bad_domain; > > ... you don't. Actually, I do. The only distinguishing error code here is GNTST_permission_denied, which is now only triggered by the XSM hook. >> --- a/xen/common/memory.c >> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c >> @@ -570,7 +570,8 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, >> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg) >> && (reservation.mem_flags & XENMEMF_populate_on_demand) ) >> args.memflags |= MEMF_populate_on_demand; >> >> - if ( unlikely(rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(reservation.domid, &d)) ) >> + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(reservation.domid); >> + if ( d == NULL ) >> return start_extent; >> args.domain = d; >> >> @@ -619,9 +620,9 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, >> XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(void) arg) >> if ( copy_from_guest(&domid, arg, 1) ) >> return -EFAULT; >> >> - rc = rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(domid, &d); >> - if ( rc ) >> - return rc; >> + d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid); >> + if ( d == NULL ) >> + return -ESRCH; > > And quite similarly here and further down you're losing -EPERM. > > Jan > Same logic: rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id will succeed where -EPERM was returned by rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id; the check is moved to the XSM hook. -- Daniel De Graaf National Security Agency _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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