[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 19/22] arch/x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
>>> On 13.09.12 at 15:46, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 09/13/2012 04:00 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 12.09.12 at 17:59, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>> When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the >>> iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain, >>> potentially allowing the current domain to bypass its more restrictive >>> iomem_access policy using another domain that it has access to. >> >> Are you sure about this? I ask because ... >> >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c >>> @@ -754,6 +754,18 @@ get_page_from_l1e( >>> return -EINVAL; >>> } >>> >>> + if ( pg_owner != curr->domain && >>> + !iomem_access_permitted(curr->domain, mfn, mfn) ) >>> + { >>> + if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */ >>> + { >>> + MEM_LOG("Domain %u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in > domain %u", >>> + curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id); >>> + return -EPERM; >>> + } >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + } >>> + >> >> ... the place you insert this is after non-RAM pages got filtered >> out already, so you're applying an IOMEM permission check to a >> RAM page. >> >> Jan >> >>> if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) || >>> !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) ) >>> return 0; > > If that's true, then the check a few lines above is also applying IOMEM > checks to RAM pages. I can see non-privileged attempts being filtered > above, I can't see how that would happen given this primary conditional if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) || (real_pg_owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page)) == dom_io ) Please clarify what you're observing. > but successful mappings will continue to the check I added. Of course. I would think that if anything, you would want to add a second call to iomem_access_permitted() with "curr->domain" right at the place where the current one is (in particular inside the above quoted conditional). Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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