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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] xen: Add versions of rcu_lock_*_domain without IS_PRIV
On 15/10/2012 16:31, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 10/15/2012 11:26 AM, Keir Fraser wrote:
>> Must we have two new calls for translating a domid to a domain? It's getting
>> to be a confusing mess isn't it? Also, here, a more consistent name for
>> rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id would be rcu_lock_any_domain_by_id, I think?
>>
>> -- Keir
>
> The original version of this patch queue removed the two _target_ calls;
> that removal is not in the current versions to avoid breaking code that is
> not yet converted (ARM and two other callers not converted).
>
> The name rcu_lock_any_domain_by_id is also fine, although it seems to imply
> that rcu_lock_domain_by_id cannot lock any domain, when the real difference
> is if they accept DOMID_SELF (hence why I chose to say any_id). Would you
> like me to send a patch changing the name?
Oh I see. No I think that's fine then.
-- Keir
>>
>> On 15/10/2012 15:02, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> While this patch is a part of my XSM IS_PRIV series, I am reposting it
>>> alone because the XSM build of xen-unstable is currently broken. I can
>>> also repost the remaining patches series if that would be helpful.
>>>
>>> --------------------------------->8----------------------------------
>>>
>>> These functions will be used to avoid duplication of IS_PRIV calls
>>> that will be introduced in XSM hooks. This also fixes a build error
>>> with XSM enabled introduced by 25925:d1c3375c3f11 which depends on
>>> this patch.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> xen/common/domain.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>>> xen/include/xen/sched.h | 11 +++++++++++
>>> 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
>>> index a1aa05e..52489b3 100644
>>> --- a/xen/common/domain.c
>>> +++ b/xen/common/domain.c
>>> @@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ struct domain *rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid_t dom)
>>> return d;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +struct domain *rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid_t dom)
>>> +{
>>> + if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
>>> + return rcu_lock_current_domain();
>>> + return rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> int rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(domid_t dom, struct domain **d)
>>> {
>>> if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
>>> @@ -454,6 +461,20 @@ int rcu_lock_remote_target_domain_by_id(domid_t dom,
>>> struct domain **d)
>>> return 0;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +int rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(domid_t dom, struct domain **d)
>>> +{
>>> + if ( (*d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
>>> + return -ESRCH;
>>> +
>>> + if ( *d == current->domain )
>>> + {
>>> + rcu_unlock_domain(*d);
>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> int domain_kill(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>> int rc = 0;
>>> diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
>>> index 53804c8..b0def4a 100644
>>> --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h
>>> +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h
>>> @@ -447,6 +447,11 @@ struct domain *domain_create(
>>> struct domain *rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid_t dom);
>>>
>>> /*
>>> + * As above function, but resolves DOMID_SELF to current domain
>>> + */
>>> +struct domain *rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(domid_t dom);
>>> +
>>> +/*
>>> * As above function, but accounts for current domain context:
>>> * - Translates target DOMID_SELF into caller's domain id; and
>>> * - Checks that caller has permission to act on the target domain.
>>> @@ -460,6 +465,12 @@ int rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id(domid_t dom, struct
>>> domain **d);
>>> */
>>> int rcu_lock_remote_target_domain_by_id(domid_t dom, struct domain **d);
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * As rcu_lock_domain_by_id(), but will fail EPERM or ESRCH rather than
>>> resolve
>>> + * to local domain.
>>> + */
>>> +int rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(domid_t dom, struct domain **d);
>>> +
>>> /* Finish a RCU critical region started by rcu_lock_domain_by_id(). */
>>> static inline void rcu_unlock_domain(struct domain *d)
>>> {
>>
>
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